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In this thesis I investigate the interworking and influences of the United Statesʼ 
federal copyright legislation, specifically its relationship to the history of artistic production 
from the late nineteenth-century to the present.  A detailed analysis of the evolving copyright 
statute, the social and legal impact of the multiple (including the counterfeit copy), and the 
progressive recurrence of representational money paintings will reveal the mutually 
dependent relationship of copyright legislation and artistic production.  The progression of 
styles in America art—nineteenth-century trompe lʼoeil illusionism, mid-century Abstract 
Expressionism, Pop art, and contemporary appropriation art—provides an illustrated 
roadmap of the complex relationship between the law, visual and consumer culture, and 
money.  I will use this roadmap to reinterpret the work of Andy Warhol and propose that his 
art making was fundamentally influenced by the tenets of American copyright legislation.  To 
visualize the intricate relationship between art and the law, I trace the progression of the 
American money painting, and its divisive other, the counterfeit, to illustrate the economic 
incentive of aesthetic originality and federal copyright legislation.  Moreover, I assert that 
Warholʼs often-segregated late work (1980s) can be cohesively connected to the core of his 
immense oeuvre when viewed through this legal lens.   
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
The major concern of the epoch—the economy—is to todayʼs art what the nude, the 
landscape, or the myth of the new were in their time to neoclassicism, impressionism, and 
avant-garde: both a motivator of creativity and a theme to the taste of the moment.1 
 
 
The law governs the social world, art is part of the social world; therefore law 
governs art.  However, as art is part of the social world that exceeds, and often tests, the 
limits of the law, the simplistic logic of this syllogism is fundamentally flawed.  Despite this 
fault, as a recent graduate of the University of Nebraska College of Law, it the intersection of 
these two seemingly disparate practices that I find most fascinating.  After graduating law 
school, I found that my approach to art history had been radically altered, and instead of 
debating the iconology of a work, I immediately questioned its legal issues: is the work 
obscene, is it protected speech, and is it copyrightable (to name a few)?  It is the last of 
these concerns, whether a work of art is copyrightable, and the aesthetic implications of this 
legality that became the basis for this thesis.  
The recent barrage of high-profile copyright issue: The Associated Press v. Fairey, 
Cariou v. Prince, Blanch v. Koons, as well as the shelving of both SOPA (Stop Online Piracy 
Act) and PIPA (Protect Intellectual Property Act), demonstrate the relevance of this type of 
inquiry.  Accordingly, in this thesis I investigate the interworking and influences of the United 
Statesʼ federal copyright legislation, specifically its relationship to the history of artistic 
production from the late nineteenth-century to the present.  A detailed analysis of the 
evolving copyright statute, the social and legal impact of the multiple (including the 
counterfeit copy), and the progressive recurrence of representational money paintings will 
reveal the mutually dependent relationship of copyright legislation and artistic production.  
The progression of styles in America art—nineteenth-century trompe lʼoeil illusionism, mid-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul Ardenne, contemporary art critic, cited by Katy Siegel and Paul Mattick in Art Works: Money (New York: 
Thames & Hudson, 2004), 11. 
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century Abstract Expressionism, Pop art, and contemporary appropriation art—provides an 
illustrated roadmap of the complex relationship between the law, visual and consumer 
culture, and money.  I will use this roadmap to reinterpret the work of Andy Warhol and 
propose that his art making was fundamentally influenced by the tenets of American 
copyright legislation.  Moreover, I assert that his often-segregated late work (1980s) can be 
cohesively connected to the core of his immense oeuvre when viewed through this legal 
lens.  To visualize the intricate relationship between art and the law, I trace the progression 
of the American money painting, and its divisive other, the counterfeit, to illustrate the 
economic incentive of aesthetic originality and federal copyright legislation.   
Capital can be defined as “wealth capable of making more wealth” (or money used to 
make money), and within Americaʼs financially motivated art world, artwork can be seen as 
an integral element of capitalist production.2  Viewed as a tangible product of the capitalist 
system (although often critical and begrudgingly), artwork parallels both the aura and power 
of money.  On the surface, both paper money and artwork appear to be nothing more than 
image and medium.  The power of money, its exchangeability for objects societal need 
and/or desire, is according to Katy Siegel and Paul Mattick, its symbolic representation of 
“the social character of productive labour,” as it “[b]inds all forms of work together to make 
one economic system.”3  To this end, Siegel and Mattick assert that “[m]oney is central to 
modern society, a society based on the principle of individual ownership, because it 
represents the social character of productive activity in a form . . . ownable by individuals.”4  
The value of money is thus not only its exchangeable value (although significant), but also 
the national productivity and fiscal success its visual form symbolizes.  In this sense, artwork 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Richard Ohmann, Selling Culture: Magazine, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the Century (London & New 
York: Verso, 1996), 50. 
3 Siegel and Mattick, Art Works: Money, 14-15. 
4 Ibid. 
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can be viewed as an exchangeable marker of a societyʼs intellectual and cultural prowess, 
and like money, it can be seen to symbolize valuable facets of a nationʼs collective identity.  
The unsolicited copying of these powerful national symbols is thus tantamount to a 
breach of national (social and economic) security, and because of this the act of 
counterfeiting has explicit legal ramifications.  Blackʼs Law Dictionary defines counterfeiting 
as the: 
[U]nlawful[l] forge[ry], copy[ing], or imitat[ation] [of] an item, especially money of a negotiable 
instrument (such as a security or promissory note) or other officially issued item of value (such 
as a postage stamp or a food stamp), or to possess such an item without authorization and 
with the intent to deceive or defraud by presenting the item as genuine (emphasis added).5  
  
In addition, counterfeiting includes the “producing or selling” of an “item that displays a 
reproduction of a genuine trademark, [that is used] to deceiv[e] buyers into thinking they are 
purchasing genuine merchandise (emphasis added).”6  The law thus regulates the 
duplicitous reproduction of both legal tender and commodity goods, and historically, artwork 
that depicts either of these reproducible symbols has come under critical and legal scrutiny.  
The relationships between law and money, art and money, and art and the law are 
interwoven in copyright jurisprudence, and localizing the societal anxiety caused by 
counterfeit deception highlights the symbiotic relationship between copyright law and 
American art making.    
Trademarks, patents and copyright represent common types of intellectual property, 
but whereas trademark denotes a distinguishable “word, phrase, or logo,”7 copyright grants 
a property right (the exclusive right to copy) in oneʼs creative expression, otherwise known 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bryan A. Garner, ed., Blackʼs Law Dictionary: Third Pocket Edition (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1996), 
157. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Garner, Blackʼs Law Dictionary, 727:  A trademark is “a word, phrase, logo or other graphic symbol used by a 
manufacturer or seller to distinguish its product or products from those of others.” In addition, the “main purpose 
of a trademark is to designate the source of goods or services.  In effect, the trademark is the commercial 
substitute for oneʼs signature.” Distinguishable for copyright, in order to receive federal protection, a trademark 
must be “(1) distinctive rather than merely descriptive or generic; (2) affixed to a product that is actually sold in 
the market place; and (3) registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark office. 
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as their “original works of authorship.”8  Therefore, although each area of trademark, patent 
and copyright law is distinct and unique, they all illustrate the nationʼs desire “to protect the 
commercial value of the productive effort of the individualʼs mind (emphasis added).”9  Since 
the commercial value—the monetary assignment—of an art object is integrally related to its 
originality and exclusivity, copyright and trademark law officially protects the unsuspecting 
American public from artʼs duplicitous other: the unsolicited derivative (or counterfeit) 
reproduction. 
The shift to an individualized federal copyright protection did not occur until The 
Copyright Act of 1976 (signed into law on October 19,1976, and generally effective January 
1, 1978), which, as previously stated, vested protection at the moment of creation rather 
than the formal act of publication.   It took Congress nearly twenty-years of “hard labor” to 
draft a suitable revision to the then antiquated Copyright Act of 1909.10  Significantly, the 
timing of these debates situates the privatization, individual and corporate, of copyright 
protection amidst a volatile period in Americaʼs art and social history: the ideological shift 
from the emotive, subjective and individualistic Abstract Expressionist style, to that of a 
glossy and depersonalized Pop Art.  Like other commercial goods, the popular arts are 
commonly identified as mass-produced products sold to the general populace by profit 
driven enterprises.  On the other hand, “fine” art, like painting, theoretically represents the 
inimitable and invaluable work of an individual.11  Therefore, the markers traditionally used to 
distinguish “high” from “low” art are the same ones currently used to determine an objectʼs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid, 147-8, and The Copyright Act of 1976. 17 USCA §§ 102-1332:  Blackʼs Law Dictionary defines copyright 
as “The right to copy a work, specifically, a property right in an original work of authorship (including a literary, 
musical, dramatic or other work) fixed in any tangible medium of expression, giving the holder the exclusive right 
to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and display the work. 
9 Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session, “Copyright Law 
Revision,” 71. 
10 William D. North, An Interim Look at the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 (Washington D.C: The American 
Library Association, 1977), 1. 
11 Siegel and Mattick, Art Works: Money, 17.     
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copyrightability:  the objectʼs originality and its intimate relationship with the venerated 
“author” genius.12  	  
To explore this relationship between legal and aesthetic theory, as previously noted, 
I analyze the continual appearance of American money paintings, in particular how their 
recurrence systematically coincides with moments of heightened social anxiety instigated by 
the proliferation of unsolicited copies and counterfeit.  In this light, the continual revision of 
American copyright legislation reflects not only the nationʼs sustained technological 
advancement, but also corresponds to the increasingly market-driven nature of “fine” art.  As 
capitalism progresses, and as wealth, consumption and “[o]bsession with money” become a 
“conspicuous sign of the times,” copyright statute and case-law continues to illuminated the 
trajectory of American artistic production.13  
Under the prevailing Copyright Act of 1976 the instant an “author” creates a “work of 
original authorship,” he or she obtains an absolute and exclusive right of property in that 
piece of work.  Under previous acts, this property right is known as “common-law copyright,” 
and so long as this right persists, with respect to a specific work, no one may reproduce or 
copy the work without the artistʼs expressed permission (the federal government governed 
copyright protection upon publication so long as the author followed its statutory formalities 
of registration and notification).14  The 1976 Act essentially dissolved common-law copyright 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 According to Justice OʼConnor, the “sine qua non of copyright is originality,” and “[t]o qualify for copyright 
protection, a work must be original to the author.”  The opinion continues to state that “[o]riginal, as the term is 
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from 
other works), and that it possess at least some minimal degree of creativity.”  The amount of originality requisite 
for copyright protection is “extremely low,” and “[t]he vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark, ʻno matter how crude, humble or obviousʼ it might be. “ Furthermore, Oʼ Connor 
asserts that “[o]riginality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other 
works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.”  Moreover, she states that the legal terms 
“author” and “writing” presuppose a degree of originality,” and quotes prominent copyright scholars Patterson & 
Joyce to stipulate that “[t]he originality requirement is constitutionally mandated for all works.” Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), 345-47; Patterson and Joyce, “Monopolizing the Law: The 
Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Complications,” UCLA Law Review 36 (1989), 763.      
13 Tim Osterwold, Pop Art (London & New York: Taschen, 1999), 30-32. 
14 Carla Phelpes, “Copyright and Art,” Art Journal 23, No. 2 (Winter 1963-1964),120-123. 
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protection, as federal protection now begins at the moment of creation, with the law 
conferring an individual monopoly to the copyright holder.  As such, copyright is commonly 
criticized as unjustifiably restricting access to American culture.  According to legal scholar 
David Bollier, “[p]art of the problem is that copyright and trademark law, as a matter of 
principle, declares that individuals are solely responsible for the value associated with 
creative works.”15  Furthermore, Bollier purports that while “[m]embers of the public are cast 
as passive consumers who have nothing creative of their own to contribute,” media 
businesses are promoted as the sole proprietors of “valuable (read as profit-making) 
culture[.]”16    On the other hand, copyright is justified as benefitting the public by promoting 
intellectual productivity, and it is argued that protecting an authorʼs “original expression of an 
idea” from third party appropriation will encourage creativity, and ultimately, disseminate 
creative works to the public at large (the public domain).17 
Given the complexity of modern copyright law in the United States, it is 
evident that copyright jurisprudence did not develop in a cultural vacuum.  Rather, it 
reflects centuries of oscillating attitudes and values ascribed to artistic production.  
Consequently, as copyright theory and doctrine are both active reflections of the 
prevailing worldview, it is not revolutionary to note that the legal understanding of the 
law changes with the nationʼs socio-economic position.18  What is notable, however, 
is that intellectual property scholars have been resistant to accept claims of cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 David Bollier, Brand Name Bullies: The Quest to Own and Control Culture (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 2005), 59. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Julie E. Cohen, “Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda,” Wisconsin Law 
Review (2011), 1, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/610 (accessed March 25, 2012). According to 
Cohen, the purported author incentive of copyright legislation is hypocritical as “copyright industries invoke 
incentives for authors disingenuously, all the while advancing their own particular interests.”   
18 Peter Jaszi, “Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?” in Making and Unmaking Intellectual Property: 
Creative Production in Legal and Cultural Perspective, edited by Mario Biagioli, Peter Jaszi, and Martha 
Woodmansee (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 415. 
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influence in the copyright field, a resistance predicated upon the “disillusioned 
position that copyright, unlike other bodies of law, is really all about the money; that 
“[intellectual property] law is simply a machine to generate innovation through 
economic incentive; and that lawyers are merely engineers called on occasionally to 
tweak or tinker with the mechanism.”19   
To fully understand this trajectory and its connection to American copyright 
jurisprudence, it is necessary to consider the origins of copyright legislation in the 
United States.  As colonial lawyers were presumably familiar with British law, the 
wording of the United Stateʼs copyright clause directly reflects the worldʼs first 
copyright statute, Englandʼs Statute of Anne, passed in 1709-1710.  The wording of 
the Statute of Anne specifically details the plagiarizing culture of eighteenth-century 
England, and the need for official government protection of “Books and other 
Writings:” 
Whereas Printers, Booksellers, and other Persons, have of late frequently taken the 
Liberty of Printing, Reprinting, and Publishing . . . Books and other Writings, without the 
Consent of the Authors or Proprietors of such Books and Writings, to their very great 
Detriment, and too often to the Ruin of them and their Families[.]20    
 
Significantly, the Statute of Anne shifted the purpose of statutory copyright from 
censorship (the preceding Licensing Act of 1694) to authorial protection.  The 
legislative safeguard was necessitated by the increasing availability of the printing 
press, which, as “the first commercially feasible method of mass production of 
intellectual property,” threatened to disassemble carefully prescribed social and 
aesthetics boundaries.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid, at 415-16.   
20 The Statute of Anne (1710), transcribed from British Library, 8 Anne c. 19, 
http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html (accessed March 15, 2012). 
21 Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session, “Copyright Law 
Revision: Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyright (Washington D.C: The 
United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 68.  
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 In the United States, the Continental Congress, aware of the agitated plight of 
the “author” and the potential consequences of unauthorized duplication, 
recommended in the late eighteenth-century (around 1783) that the states provide 
copyright protection to its constituents.  Twelve states had passed copyright laws 
prior to the Constitutional Convention; however statutes were limited in scope to the 
territorial jurisdiction of the particular state.  There was no national uniform copyright 
protection.  Without federal copyright protection creative works were continually 
exposed to pirating and unlicensed reproduction, thereby threatening the 
autonomous enclave of art production.22  To counteract this contentious threat, on 
September 17, 1787, the Constitution of the United States of America, as the 
supreme law of the land, specifically empowered Congress to regulate the fraudulent 
reproduction of both forms of social capital (fiscal and cultural):  the production of 
money and the “useful Arts.”  Respectively, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 5 of the 
Constitution vested in Congress the exclusive right “To coin Money, regulate the 
Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; 
while Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, commonly known as the Copyright Clause, 
empowered Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”23  
Chapter One, entitled, “Money Painting, Counterfeit, and the Origins of 
Copyright,” analyzes antebellum art and culture and its affect on the enactment and 
development of federal counterfeit and copyright statutes.  Congress first enacted its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Ibid, 69.  
23 U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 (1788), Cornell University Law School, Legal Information 
Institute, U.S. Institution, Article 1, http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlei#section8 (accessed, July 1, 
2012). 
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Constitutional grant of power in 1790, only three years after the end of the American 
Revolution.  It is therefore feasible to presume that Congress enacted The Copyright 
Act of 1790 as a means to solidify the nationʼs collective identity, by promoting “[t]he 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”24  As copyright protected an authorʼs right to 
publish, and economically profit from his/her creative work, I will identify and locate 
how copyright regulations worked to pacify Americaʼs growing distrust of cheap, 
duplicative imagery, in the consumerist economy of the late-nineteenth century.  With 
the rising tide of mass-produced commodities, money became the nationʼs most 
potent symbol.  As the federal government moved to solidify a uniform monetary 
system during a century wrought with financial panics and counterfeit currency; in 
shift from industrial to consumer capitalism, it also identified the benefit, symbolic 
and economic, of regulating the nationʼs creative currency, its artistic production. 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, “technological advances, 
industrial mass-production, new methods of communication, increases in disposable 
incomes, and proliferating channels of distribution” contributed to the rapid expansion 
of the retail sector.25   The rapid growth of mass-produced commodities necessitated 
new methods of publicity, promotion, and distribution.  By the early twentieth-century, 
these new forms of advertisement featured their own identifiable iconography that 
“enforced likeness and consolidated a dominant machinery of specifically capitalist 
representation.”26  As visual culture developed, the law rapidly evolved to promote 
and protect these new forms of reproductive imagery while superficially attempting to 
reinforce traditional aesthetic hierarchies.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. 
25 Christoph Grunenberg, “Wonderland: Spectacles of Display from the Bon Marché” in Shopping: A Century of 
Art and Consumer Culture, Christoph Grunenberg and Max Hollein, eds. (Frankfurt: Hatje Cantz Publishers, 
2002), 18. 
26 Thomas Richards, The Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and Spectacle, 1851-1914 
(London & New York: Verso, 1991), 251, as cited in Grunenberg “Wonderland,” 19-20. 
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In Chapter Two, entitled, “Money, Marketplace, and the Conflicted Origins of 
the Copyright Act of 1909,” and Chapter Three, entitled, “Pop Art, Andy Warhol, and 
the Aesthetic Limitations the Copyright Act of 1909,” I move the discussion of 
copyright and artistic production into the twentieth-century.  In Chapter Two, I identify 
the Supreme Court case Bleistein v. Donaldson, which held a purely commercial 
chromolithograph to be copyrightable, as the theoretical precursor to Pop art and the 
work of Andy Warhol.  To bolster this assertion, I analyze the semantics and 
application of the Copyright Act of 1909, and in Chapter Three, I relate itʼs economic 
concerns to Warholʼs Pop art money paintings.  In this Chapter, I trace the 
development of Warholʼs education and career.  After a topical, formal, and legal 
analysis of his art work, I assert that the progression of Warholʼs style, as illustrated 
through his serial images of money and consumer goods, represents a cynical 
manipulation of Americaʼs historical distrust of mechanically reproduced imagery, 
and as such, Warholʼs Pop art reflects the impetus of Americaʼs copyright and 
counterfeit legislation. 
Finally, in Chapter Four, entitled, “Individualized Copyright Legislation and an 
Indexical Warhol: An Artistʼs Legal Critique,” I articulate the applicability of stringent 
copyright protection in a (arguably) postmodern epoch.  The prevailing 1976 Act is 
the product of a long series of compromises reflecting the “constantly changing 
technology, commercial and financial interests, political and social conditions, judicial 
and administrative developments and – not least by any means – individual 
personalities.”27  Therefore, the evolving prose of the 1976 Act can be seen to reflect 
the dramatic aesthetic debates occurring alongside the statuteʼs negotiation, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Barbara Ringer, “First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976” in The Copyright Act of 1976: Dealing with the 
New Realities , Alan Latman, ed. (New York: Law Journal Press, 1977), 15. 
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statutes phrasing can be viewed as legally articulating the mid-century debate over 
the merit of Abstract Expressionism and Pop art.   
I argue that the drafters of the 1976 Act strategically adopted an Abstract 
Expressionist ideology, promoting individuality, in order to theoretically justify the 
increased privatization of culture for corporate interests.  An analysis of the business-
art phenomenon of the late twentieth-century not only illustrates the coercive nature 
of copyright statute, but also how its rights and regulations motivated artistic 
production.  The late artwork and business ventures of Andy Warhol tangibly 
illustrates the complexity of these relationships, and copyright legislation provides a 
cohesive lens through which to incorporate his often segregated late work into the 
totality of his artistic oeuvre.   
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CHAPTER 1:  Money Painting, Counterfeit, and the Origins of Copyright 
 
A Society demonstrates its vitality through wealth, power, and culture, high and low. Power 
alone breeds sterility . . . Wealth alone breeds decadence . . . And culture?28 
 
 
Currency, Counterfeit and the Creation of a National Anxiety: 
 
In the nineteenth century, America was a young and rapidly developing 
nation, pulsating with social and political anxiety, and central to this malcontent was 
the nationʼs evolving national identity and volatile paper currency.  Paper money was 
an integral part of American life by the mid nineteenth-century.  In the period 
between the American Revolution and the Civil War, however, its currency—
paralleling the nationʼs political atmosphere—was plagued by uncertainty and 
distrust.  Federal power was severely restricted during the Jacksonian era, and as 
local communities and state governments dominated the political spectrum, they also 
administered its monies.29  At the local level, bankers could acquire the right to 
create money by obtaining a corporate charter from their state bank.  After depositing 
bonds (or other assets) with the state government, a bank could than hire an 
engraver to design and print its banknotes.  Essentially, the resulting printed bits of 
paper represented a bank-issued loan, a promise between a lender (the bank) and 
its holders.  Banks and bankers thus became the nationʼs principal capitalists, and 
they underwrote enterprise while simultaneously providing a medium of exchange.30  
Compounding the confusion, multifarious state-chartered corporations, like 
insurance companies, railroads, as well as numerous unchartered banking and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Daniel Bell, “Modernism Mummified,” American Quarterly 39, no. 1, Special Issue: Modernist Culture in 
America (Spring, 1987), 129. 
29 David R. Johnson, Illegal Tender: Counterfeiting and the Secret Service in Nineteenth Century America 
(Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), x-xi. 
30 Stephen Mihm, A Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making of the United States 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 1. 
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merchant operations also created their own independently designed bank notes.31  
Not surprisingly, the national monetary system quickly became convoluted and 
untrustworthy, and counterfeiting became a widespread epidemic.  It has been 
estimated that during the 1850s, almost forty-percent of all circulating paper money 
was counterfeit.32 
At the time of the Civil War, the term “counterfeiting” embodied all forms of 
fraudulent production (coins, bonds, and currency), and was broadly defined as a 
monetary note “[m]ade with the intention of deceit and for use as a genuine bill.”33  
During this period, counterfeiters preferred Confederate currency and bonds because 
due to the poor quality of their raw materials and the unskilled engravers, the bills 
could be easily reproduced.  They obtained sample material in many ways, including 
trade, and in some instances the original printing plates were usurped.34  The capture 
of Confederate Treasury note plates by Union forces further perpetuated the anxiety 
of a bifurcated Nation.  Southern officials subsequently accused the Union 
government of counterfeiting its money in order to circulate it back into its financial 
system, with the intent of devastating the Southern economy.35  But the Civil War 
(1861-1865) also ended Jacksonian-style democracy with its decentralized and 
essentially impotent federal government.  The emerging, and soon dominant, 
Republican Party promoted a “[d]octrine [that] advocated the development of an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid, 3. 
32 Bruce W. Chambers, Old Money: American Trompe LʼOeil Images of Currency (New York: Berry-Hill Galleries, 
Inc., 1988), 13-14. 
33 Judith Ann Benner, Fraudulent Finance: Counterfeiting and the Confederate States: 1861-1865 (Waco: Texan 
Press, 1970), 3-4. Counterfeits also fraudulently reproduced stamps and parole certificates issued to captured 
enemy soldiers. Furthermore, in newspaper accounts of the period, little distinction was made between the terms 
of fraudulent finance: counterfeits, facsimiles, forgeries, or bogus.  Practically speaking, however, there were 
slight variances between the terms: a facsimile was legitimately reproduced as a souvenir (but it could be used 
with the intention to fraud); a forgery was a note or bond signed with unofficial dates and signatures, and a bogus 
note or bond was a work of pure fiction, and never issued under the named authority. Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, 9-12. 
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infrastructure for a national capital market through the use of centralized state 
power.”36  Specifically, in response to the economic threat of counterfeit reproduction, 
the federal government sought to reestablish national confidence by asserting its 
Constitutional grant of sovereignty over the nationʼs banking systems and currency 
production.37      
Americaʼs general aversion to centralized national authority had historically 
undermined the establishment of a centralized banking system, as it was feared that 
a strong federal government would infringe upon individual liberties.  As such, the 
nationʼs monetary battles—between individuals, businesses and government—was 
often akin to a debate over control and power.  The government asserted its federal 
control over currency with two legislative acts: the Legal Tender Act of 1862, and the 
subsequent National Banking Act of 1863.  As the now sole purveyor of a national 
currency, the federal government taxed state bank notes out of existence and 
permanently enhanced federal power.38  According to historian Bray Hammond, “the 
establish[ment] of a national monetary medium which derived its value from the will 
of the government . . . as an exercise of sovereignty advanced the governmentʼs 
powers far beyond what had been ascribed to it before.”39    
The relationship between individual American citizens, the federal 
government and its currency underwent a profound shift in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century.  The federal government retained its jwartime urisdiction over the 
nationʼs money supply in order to eliminate the anxiety commonly associated with 
privately created currency and the profusion of counterfeit tender.  The promoters of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Johnson, Illegal Tender, xi-xii. 
37 Ibid, x-xi. 
38 Ibid, pp. x-xii. 
39 Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks and Politics in the Civil War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), 226-27. 
	   	   15	  
	  
a federal banking system felt that a centralized currency would inspire confidence in 
the nation, as “It [was] impossible to alter National Bank Notes from a lower 
denomination to a higher, and there is not now one dangerous counterfeit where 
under the old system there were a hundred.”40  To protect its new currency, and to 
combat the countryʼs lingering apprehensions, the federal government fastidiously 
safeguarded the new monies, through counterfeit legislation and the enactment of 
the secret service, from both the contemptuous counterfeiter and the critically 
disparaged illusionistic artist. 
 
Centralized Money and The Rise of the American Leisure Class:  The Social 
Significance of Commodity Goods and the Origins of Copyright Law    
     
After the Revolution, Americans feared that liberty would become corrupt 
without the “careful nurture of virtue,” and efforts to construct an “inspiring civil 
culture” were generally supported.41  These fears intensified as the government 
became increasingly democratic, shifting the risk of tyranny to the free will of the 
people rather than the threat of an omnipotent corrupt ruler.42  Alexis de Tocqueville, 
a French political thinker and historian, faulted the “irresistible strength” of Americaʼs 
popular democracy:  
When a man or a party suffers an injustice in the United States, to whom can he turn?  
To public opinion?  That is what forms the majority.  To the legislative body? It 
represents the majority and obeys it blindly. To executive power?  It is appointed by 
the majority and serves as its impassive instrument[.]43 
 
According to de Tocqueville, two situations facilitated majority oppression: first, the 
decentralized American government, and second, the prestige of lawyers—“a profession 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mihm, A Nation of Counterfeiters, 361-62. 
41Anne C. Rose, Voices of the Marketplace: American Thought and Culture, 1830-1860 (New York, Twayne 
Publishers, 1995), 41. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence, J.P Mayer, ed. (Garden City: 
Doubleday/Anchor, 1969), 252. 
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with the “tastes and habits of an aristocracy,” and a “secret scorn [of a] government of the 
people.44 
 In 1838, a young Abraham Lincoln advocated the advantage of institutional authority, 
and proposed a greater “reverence for the constitution and laws” as a cure for the nations 
escalating instability.45   Significantly, Lincoln, himself a lawyer, expressly appealed to the 
supremacy and sanctity of the federal law to protect the nation from “men of ambition and 
talent,” e.g. lawyers, who in the pursuit of personal grandeur, did not care whether they were 
“emancipating slaves, or enslaving freemen.”46  Amidst the growing distrust of democratic 
ideals, Americaʼs political ideology began to shift and emphasize the Whig-like tenets of 
coherence and order, and consequently, the benefits of strong federal governance.47   
As the decades after the Civil War progressed, Americans recognized that its 
politics, and parties, were largely influenced by external—capitalist—conditions.  And as 
industrial capitalism began to shape American culture, often with the government 
subsidizing new industries like the railroads, copyright and law developed to regulate its 
products.  In 1850, Americans made much of what they needed domestically, and six out of 
every ten people worked on personal farms.  By 1900, however, only thirty-nine percent of 
Americans worked on farms, and the impetus of production shifted from personal use to 
commercial sale.48  The concept and word “consumer” appeared during this period, as 
agricultural production shifted to industrial, including factory-made goods.  As capital and 
labor became detached from traditional family and community values and was instead 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid, p. 264, as cited in Rose, Voices of the Market Place, 42. 
45 Abraham Lincoln, “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions,” as cited in Rose, Voices of the Market Place, 
47. Abraham Lincoln delivered this speech to the Young Menʼs Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, in 1838. 
46 Rose, Voices of the Market Place, 47.  
47 Ibid.  Each half of the bifurcated nation reflected these ideals, albeit with slight variance: the Southern 
conservatives sought material progress as achieved through duty and respect; while the Northern Unionists 
focused on geographic and economic expansion effected by self-regulating freeholders, protected by a uniform 
national policy.     
48 Richard Ohmann, Selling Culture: Magazines, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the Century (London & New 
York: Verso, 1996), 48. 
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invested in business and market-oriented concerns, the “exchange and circulation of money 
and goods [became] the foundation of [Americaʼs] aesthetic life and of its moral 
sensibility[es].”49 	  
The shift to consumer capitalism placed an exorbitant amount of cheap 
manufactured goods in the American marketplace, and as a result, societyʼs well-being 
became directly associated with the consumption of goods.  The pleasure attached to 
commodity goods, however, was in tension with the competitive risks of the periodʼs laissez-
faire ideology.  From a business perspective, the constant economic risks of laissez-faire 
competition garnered fear and trepidation: “You know how often I had not an unbroken 
nightʼs sleep, worrying about how it was all coming out.  All the fortune I had made has not 
served to compensate for the anxiety of the period. Work by day and worry by night[.]”50   
The competitive corporate mentality of consumer capitalism thus fostered a wavering 
sense of personal identity, and the growing influence of a monied class, in a combination 
with a growing disparity in wealth, exacerbated the American peopleʼs discontent.  As wealth 
and power and became progressively concentrated in a “leisure class,” individuals 
aggressively competed for their social status.  Significantly, social climbing was based on 
the “acquisition of symbols of status,” and thus social standing could be identified by oneʼs 
individual taste, and illustrated by the proper display of commodity goods.51   
According to sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, “tast[e] [is predisposed] to function as 
markers of ʻclass,ʼ” and correspondingly, historian Linda Young argued that in the 
nineteenth-century, “refined taste implied refined morality.”52  As external markers of taste 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1993), 3. 
50 Quoted by Robert L. Heilbroner and Aaron Singer, Economic Transformations of America (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 106, as cited in Ohmann, Selling Culture, 54. 
51 Ibid, 77. 
52 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Richard Nice, trans. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1984), 1-2; Linda Young, Middle-Class Culture in the Nineteenth Century: America, 
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and class, commodity goods not only marked social class, but also the latent fear that 
“genteel” life—like the arbitrary value assigned to goods and services—was artificial, and 
that oneʼs political, social and economic position could be easily usurped by a competitor.  
Consequently, to solidify the economic and cultural components of social status, the 
American nouvelle-riche combined their money into massive industrial and financial trusts, 
and deemed themselves the professional “arbiters of taste.”53   
By establishing institutions to safeguard his cultural authority, the American 
businessman asserted the primacy of his mode of aesthetic appreciation, and identified his 
“mission” to “beautify the world, beginning with [his] own perso[n] and radiating to all [he] 
possessed and influenced.”54  The “possession of tasteful goods” not only “evidenced 
genteel affiliation,” but also cohesively “connect[ed] economic power and encultured learning 
[to] the practice of consumerism.”55  As an elitist notion of fine art became the epitome of 
“tasteful goods,” it was quickly connected to an ideology of consumption.  Amid the 
competitive threat of social displacement, the legal system progressed to insure the 
original/authentic status of its elite social markers—money and artwork.     
 
The Deceitful Art: Trompe LʼOeil and the Aesthetics of a Counterfeit Culture 
At the turn of the century, as the period of “conspicuous consumption” 
continued to progress, money, especially in its paper embodiment, became a cultural 
and artistic obsession.  From 1877, when William Michael Harnett painted the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Australia and Britain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 88.  Bourdieu continues to state, “[t]he manner in 
which culture has been acquired lives on in the manner of using it: the importance attached to manners can be 
understood one it is seen that it is these imponderables of practice which distinguish the different—and ranked—
modes of culture acquisition, early or late, domestic or scholastic, and the classes of individuals which they 
characterize (such as ʻpendantsʼ and mondains). Culture also has its titles of nobility—awarded by the 
educational system—and its pedigrees, measured by seniority in admission to the nobility.” Bourdieu, Distinction, 
1-2. 
53 Chambers, Old Money, p. 14. 
54 Richard Bushman, The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities (New York: Knopf, 1992), 96. 
55 Young, Middle-Class Culture in the Nineteenth Century, 91. 
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image of American paper currency, Still Life Five-Dollar Bill (Fig. 1), 1877, through 
the first decades of the twentieth-century, more than twenty American painters 
addressed the theme of money.56  In Harnettʼs early money paintings, such as 
American Exchange (Fig. 2), 1878, he painted paper money in combination with 
other objects—coins, books, inkwells and letters—in a trompe lʼoeil manner, and 
strategically titled the works to relate the objects to the American businessman.  In 
later money works, however, he isolates the paper banknote and meticulously 
rendered isolated life-size images of government-issued currency.  Even though 
Harnett worked within the worldly and time-honored tradition of trompe lʼoeil, as 
“trompe lʼoeil paper money became a predominant and widespread art form only in 
the [United States,]” his money paintings can be considered uniquely American.57   
The trompe lʼoeil paintings of Harnett and his followers were preceded by the 
work of the illustrious Peale family, specifically that of Raphaelle Peale, who was 
primarily noted for his highly illusionistic, if not trompe lʼoeil, still life paintings.  While 
efforts to directly connect Peale to Harnett, stylistically and thematically, have been 
largely unsuccessful, the similarity of their technique signifies the persevering 
practice of hyper-illusionism in the United States.58  Trompe lʼoeil, the most extreme 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 A brief list of trompe lʼoeil money painters includes: Jacob Atkinson, Nicholas A. Brooks, Ferdinand Danton, 
Jr., Victor Dubreuil, John Haberle, Thomas H. Hope, Otis Kaye, Peter McCallon, Charles Alfred Meurer, and 
John Frederick Peto.  For more information see, Chambers, Old Money, 121-31. 
57 Marc Shell, Art & Money (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 87.  According to 
Shell, in seventeenth-century Europe, especially in commercial centers, still life works often contained 
arrangements of realistic monetary tokens, however, “[t]he focus here was not on the unique status of coin or 
bank note as money but on its mundane position as one visible thing among others.” Ibid. 
58 Nicolai Cikovsky, Jr., “ʼSordid Mechanicsʼ and ʻMonkey-Talentsʼ: The Illusionistic Tradition,” in William M. 
Harnett, Doreen Bolger, Marc Simpson, and John Wilmerding, eds. (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1992), 19-
20.  In his seminal publication After the Hunt: William Harnett and Other American Still Life Painters, art historian 
Alfred Frankenstein tentatively attributes the first money painting to Raphaelle Peale, stating that he “may have 
painted a bank note in his picture of 1795 entitled A Bill (now lost),” and that “[a]ccording to the Dictionary of 
American English, the use of the word ʻbillʼ as a synonym for ʻbanknoteʼ can be found in American documents as 
early as 1682; if Raphaelleʼs bill was a piece of paper money, this work anticipated one of Harnettʼs favorite 
subjects by more than eighty years, and there are no known examples of the same subjects in American art in all 
the intervening time.”  Alfred Frankenstein, After the Hunt: William Harnett and Other American Still Life Painters, 
1870-1900 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), 31-32.    
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form of illusionistic representation, pushes beyond mere convincingness into the 
realm of deception.  According to Nicolai Cikovsky, Jr., “[i]t is the form that is the 
least likely [t]o be transmitted directly by its precedents,” and moreover, “[trompe 
lʼoeil] is less a matter of individual style than of the stylistic depersonalizing 
requirements of verisimilitude and strategies of visual deception.”59  A marginal 
enterprise, trompe lʼoeil paintings and painters were relegated to the lowest echelon 
of the artistic hierarchy.  According to nineteenth-century British painter James Barry, 
a trompe lʼoeil painter was “mere[ly] a sordid mechanic, divested of intellectual 
capacity; and artist John Opie admonished the technique as a “petty kind of monkey-
talent.”60 
The most threatening thing about illusionism was not the artist himself, but 
the audience to whom the discursive imagery appealed:  “illusionism was a popular 
style, not merely in the sense that it was widely liked, but that it was widely liked by 
the common people, the populace.”61  Moreover, and even more ominous, was the 
danger that the popularity of trompe lʼoeil paintings posed to the “[d]ignity and 
decorum of high art.”62  Harnettʼs oeuvre is the embodiment of these aesthetic and 
financial concerns.  First, his patrons were often self-promoting “progressive men 
[newspaper men, bankers, stationers, and brewers] who participated in, and even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid, 20. 
60 James Barry and John Opie, in Lectures on Painting, by the Royal Academicians: Barry, Opie, and Fuseli, 
Ralph N. Wornum, ed. (London: Henry G. Hohn, 1848), 93, 97, 248; as cited in Cikovsky, Jr., “ʼSordid 
Mechanics,ʼ” 22.  Still life imagery was almost universally held in low regard, and in the seventeenth-century it 
was assigned the lowest rank in the academic classification of subject matter, a sentiment that was maintained 
two hundred years later.  According to this hierarchy, its “low and confined” subject matter “lacked the human 
interest, moral force, and intellectual substance possessed in highest form by depictions of heroic historical 
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Discourses on Art, Robert R. Wark, ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975).    
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62 Ibid, 23. 
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initiated, the massive social, economic, and technological changes of the age.”63 
Second, his works were not always displayed in the traditional academic setting, and 
instead were exhibited in urban spaces of industry and commerce:  saloons, 
drugstores, department stores, factory offices, and “[i]ndustrial fair[s] that catered to 
the interests and needs of the business community.”64  And third, in a departure from 
the standard still life imagery of “natureʼs bounty” (luxurious fruits, flowers, deserts, 
and beverages), Harnett pragmatically depicted material possessions and wealth, 
mundane and man-made objects suggestive of “[a] turbulent America in the strains 
of Reconstruction, industrial growth and political and financial corruption.”65  The 
trompe lʼoeil canvas, especially the money painting, thus connects both the desire 
and anxiety associated with consumer capitalism to the artistic production of the day, 
and visually correlates the mass-produced consumer good to the sacrosanct art 
object.   
According to Michael Leja, to survive the competitive cons and trickery 
common in late nineteenth-century New York City, one needed to master the art of 
“see[ing] skeptically:” 
To function successfully . . . every inhabitant of the modern city, every target of 
competitive marketing, every participant in the new mass culture, every beneficiary of 
modern science and technology, every believer in spiritual realms had to process 
visual experiences with some measure of suspicion, caution, and guile.  The visual 
arts—including the fine arts and the larger visual culture of commercial amusements, 
photographic illustrations, and pictorial advertising—played a complex and varied part 
in this process, fostering this way of looking and responding to it.  They helped make 
“looking askance”—to use the period lingo—a generally shared habit, and they 
learned to engage in a viewership that peered out through suspicious eyes.66  
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64 Ibid. 
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Harnett was the most prominent and influential trompe lʼoeil painter working in 
Philadelphia and New York in the late nineteenth-century.  As such, his work actively 
“participated in [the] prevailing cultural discourse of illusion, deception, fraud and 
humbug,” and “[w]as closely connected to the tricks of the confidence ma[n], [t]he 
showmanship of P. T. Barnum and the spectatorship he constructed, and to the 
controversy over the flimsy representative power of money.”67  Harnettʼs money 
paintings thus functioned as “both an emblem of and a catalyst for” the perceptual 
confusion and resultant anxiety that is “conventionally associated with the 
nineteenth-century metropolis.”68    
In 1887, Harnett submitted Bad Counterfeit, an oil on panel similar to Still Life 
Five Dollar Bill (Fig. 1), fastidiously depicting a ten-dollar bill, to the annual exhibition 
of the National Academy of Design in New York.  The pithy title demonstrates 
Harnettʼs knowledge of the growing tension between the “replication of money for the 
sake of art and, conversely, for the sake of fraudulent profit.”69  According to Johanna 
Drucker, “[t]he thematic range of Harnettʼ[s] paintings [d]isplays a distinct self-
consciousness about the activity of representation,” and by “[b]eginning with the 
repeated selection of items of paper money, they engage with the codes of image as 
value—with actual value of a greenback marked $10, [a]nd its value as part of an 
artistic work.”70  The illusionistic illustration of money thus firmly places artistic 	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Marc Simpson, and John Wilmerding, eds. (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc.,  1992), 31-32. 
68 James W. Cook, The Arts of Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of Barnum (Cambridge and London: 
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representation within Americaʼs capitalist system of currency and exchange, and, as 
potent conveyors of national symbols (legal tender and artwork), artistic and 
counterfeit production became increasingly subject to legal protection and 
regulations. 
  Beginning in the 1870s, the Secret Service aggressively captured and 
convicted counterfeiters, and began to prosecute anyone who impinged upon the 
symbolic value of currency.71  Andrew Drummond, head of the Secret Service from 
1891-1894, stated that “The Securities and Coins of all countries should be held 
sacred, that people, especially manufacturers, should not seek to transform them 
into curiosities (emphasis added).”72  Although Harnettʼs paintings, like Still-Life Five 
Dollar Bill (Fig. 1), were not counterfeits per se, since their mimetic quality was purely 
aesthetic rather than spendable, after seeing one of the artistʼs money paintings 
hanging in a prominent New York City saloon (Stewartʼs at 8 Warren Street), Secret 
Service agents raided his studio and proceeded to prosecute him under federal 
counterfeit law.73  Harnett was let go with a warning, but he quickly abandoned the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
elements of a linguistic system to be one of the overarching metaphors of linguist Ferdinand de Saussure,  “who 
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the nineteenth-century belief in “intrinsic, essential, or transcendent value,” and a move toward a “twentieth-
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172 § 11, 13 Stat. 218, 221-22, as cited by Julie K. Staple, “Money Talks: The First Amendment Implications of 
Counterfeit Law,” Indiana Law Journal 7, iss. 1, Article 5 (1995), 157.   
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project under the threat of future litigation: “Harmless though it was, it was clearly 
against the law, and I was let go with a warning not to paint any more life-like 
representations of national currency.”74  The aforementioned statement clearly 
illustrates the inherent tension between art and the law in late nineteenth-century 
America (a tension that continues to the present), and illustrates how the fear of 
litigation can be an influential factor in artistic production.  Furthermore, in a period of 
ruthless business tactics, competitive social mobility, and vacillating modes of value, 
the illegality of “counterfeiting” and its increasing legal ramifications clearly illustrates 
the cultural need (and desire) to properly identify the authentic—the singular “real” 
object versus its duplicitous reproduction.  
By the end of the nineteenth century money had become a sacred and 
inviolable object that was not to be manipulated by banks, counterfeiters, or artists 
under the fear of legal prosecution.75  Money, specifically paper money, thus became 
a concentrated symbol of the United Stateʼs increasingly powerful federal 
government.  As a standardized federal currency was integrated into American 
commerce, it came to signify a freshly minted capitalist elite and the resultant 
disquiet of an inherently fungible social hierarchy.  And while the federal government 
visually and economically concentrated its authority by implementing a national 
monetary system, the unstable elite anxiously attempted to control the realm of 
culture—as the self-appointed “arbiters of taste”—to secure their position.  For 
example, venerable art critics like Clarence Cook issued scathing reviews of trompe 
lʼoeil works in order to clearly delineate the boundaries of high and low culture.   
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In the first major newspaper review of Harnettʼs work at the National 
Academy of Design, Cook famously expressed the “indignation of a high cultural 
gatekeeper coming into contact with an artistic work he perceived as so obviously 
vulgar and threatening that it must be repressed immediately (the review concerned 
Harnettʼs The Social Club, a small still life study of a grouping of pipes and matches 
in the trompe lʼoeil technique):” 
Last Year, Mr. William M. Harnett had several pictures in the exhibition of the same 
general character as this Social Club, and they attracted the attention that is always 
given to curiosities, to works in which the skill of the human hand is ostentatiously 
displayed working in deceptive imitation of Nature . . . Imitative work is not really so 
difficult as it seems to the layman, and though there are degrees of it, yet when we 
come down to works like this of Mr. Harnett, it is evident that only time and industry 
are necessary to the indefinite multiplications of them.  There are sign-painters in 
this city of ours—and in all great cities today—who have only to be discontented 
with their honest calling to aim at the name of artist, to rival Mr. Harnett (emphasis 
added).76  
 
Secret Service agents, in the pursuit of counterfeit money, performed a similar gate-
keeping function.  During the interrogation of Harnett in his New York art studio, the 
agent demanded to know whether he had anymore of “those counterfeits” lying 
around—counterfeit, of course, referring to his paintings.77  Although probably 
unbeknownst to the agent, this comparison between art and money not only describe 
the eliteʼs admonishment of an increasingly influential “popular” taste (for example, 
for the spectacle of trompe lʼoeil curiosities), but also forecasts the lawʼs effort to 
preserve a definition of originality in art resistant to the wiles commodity culture. 
 
Beautiful Commodities: The Escalating Fear of Mechanical Reproduction 
 
As previously described, in mid-nineteenth century America, paper bills “were 
highly-scrutinized, anxiety-inducing objects,” and in order to effectively distinguish 	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the real from the counterfeit, a variety of bank note reporters and counterfeit 
detectors came into print.78  John Conway, describes a group of these detectors as 
“currency aesthetes,” as they shared the mentality that “individual pieces of money 
are works of art, and that in order to preserve their economic value as currency, they 
must adhere to fine aesthetic standards;” moreover, as Laban Heath, a prominent 
currency aesthete, resoundingly states, “The people like, not only a genuine bill, but 
a beautiful one.”79  Currency aesthetes believed that the counterfeit epidemic could 
be cured by imbuing paper money with the “timeless qualities of genuine art,” and 
sought to categorize formal criteria that could identify real from counterfeit money.80  
However, as the federal government moved to standardize a centrally regulated 
currency an aesthetic debate emerged amongst currency aesthetes as to how the 
new money should be produced.  On one hand, engraver W.L. Ormsby advocated an 
artisanal model of production, whereby one artist should hand engrave a single 
vignette of a historical scene to cover the entire surface of the bill.  According to 
Ormsby, “The protection from counterfeiting in such a vignette, consists, simply, in 
the presumed lack of skill on the part of him who attempts.  Nothing More.”81   
Conversely, detectors like Laban Heath promoted a system of production 
utilizing the latest mechanical engraving technologies—the geometric lathe: “[t]he 
general principle upon which the detection of counterfeits is based is that all parts of 
genuine notes are engraved by machinery . . . [w]hile all counterfeit notes are 	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engraved by hand.”82  In a discussion of the geometrical lathe, Frances Robertson 
notes that “[s]elf-acting tools were not only useful for producing identical banknote 
images; they were being designed, produced, and installed in factories to allow the 
rapid, reliable, and cheap production of identical products.”83  The debate between 
Ormsby and Heath—the merits of originality versus mechanical reproduction—can 
thus be read in relation to the elitistʼs simmering anxiety over the mechanical 
reproduction of works of “fine” art (as a form of counterfeit duplication).  And as the 
strong-arm of the government legislatively fought to eradicate the production of 
counterfeit money, as art became “big business,” the law increasingly regulated the 
terms and methods of artistic production, reflecting a similar worry over mechanical 
copying.      
In the mid-nineteenth century, reproductive prints of fine art were commonly 
regarded as a “respectable means of disseminating art and its ideals.”84  For 
example, The Nation, in 1865, published a two-part article entitled “Multiplied Art,” in 
which it passionately advocated the benefits of artistic reproduction:  “[i]f one has a 
child to educate in beauty and thought as seen in graphic art, he can find no way so 
simple, and no simple way so good, as to familiarize his pupil with the best multiplied 
art he can procure[,]” and furthermore, “[i]t is certain that Americans can get more 
good from the contents of their portfolios [of reproductions] than from anything they 
see of a statelier kind of art.”85  To perpetuate this didactic sentiment, professional 
artists like Rembrandt Peale created drawing manuals for the untrained populace 	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with the express purpose of “spreading democracy from the political realm to the 
world of art.”86  This educational impetus for democratizing artistic production reflects 
the fledgling nationʼs fear of an elitist centralized power, something too reminiscent of 
the British monarchy and allied institutions (including the Royal Academyʼs monopoly 
on artistic ideals).  As the United States Democratic Review observed in 1858, 
“Anyone who can learn to write, can learn to draw,” and the history of art “is a 
prolonged record of the patronage of princes and nobles, blossoming only in royal 
gardens and beneath the sunshine of opulence and wealth.  Democratic art, until 
within a few years, was a thing unknown.”87  
This egalitarian reverence was short lived.  As power, illustrated through the 
control of money, became corporately centralized, the late nineteenth-century elite 
aggressively attempted to solidify their cultural hegemony.  In the essay “The 
Almighty Dollar: Money as a Theme in American Painting,” Edward Nygren asserts 
that the 1880s marked a change in “attitude toward the pursuit and accumulation of 
money.”88  According to Nygren, during this period the aggressive pursuit of wealth 
came under popular attack, as increased “[a]ttention [was] given to the growing 
financial power of a few industrialists and the increased division between the rich and 
the rest of society[.]”89  As the concentration of money became increasingly taboo, 
the art object, rather than legal tender, became the marker of power and prestige.   
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Consequently, as America transitioned from industrial to consumer-based 
capitalism, the late nineteenth-century capitalists, including the cultural capitalists 
(the “arbiters of taste”) recognized the need “to take broad controls over their world in 
order to continue amassing wealth peacefully.”90  To insure the value of their product, 
capitalists attempted a variety of schemes to restrict production and share markets. 
Notably, as the consumerist demand for saleable artwork began to rapidly increase, 
the culturally elite vociferously condemned the morality of the mechanical 
reproduction—specifically the degenerative qualities of the chromolithograph print.91   
 
The Chromo-Counterfeit:  Art, Money and the Fear of Cultural Degradation    
In 1894 novelist William Dean Howell, in A Traveller from Altruria, described the late-
nineteenth-century populace as, “[p]urely commercial people; money is absolutely to the 
fore; and business, which is the means of getting the most money, is the American ideal.”92  
By the last half of the nineteenth century, chromolithography, or colored lithography, was big 
business, and it effectively placed artwork into the profit-generating world of corporate 
industry, tangibly equating art with the mass-produced commodity good (Figs. 3-6).  It was 
Alois Senefelder, the inventor of lithography, who first attempted a chromolithograph print 
(hereinafter “chromo”) in the early nineteenth century.93  From its beginnings, 
chromolithography was intended to be a reproductive process: Senefelder himself stated, 
“[t]he manner of printing in different colors is peculiar to the stone, and capable of such a 
degree of perfection that I have no doubt the perfect painting will one day be produced by 
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it.”94  Shortly thereafter it was reported in an American mechanicsʼ magazine that a “new 
mode of copying oil paintings, by means of lithography” had been created.95 The first 
American chromolithograph was printed in 1840, and by the end of the century its printers 
were operating multimillion-dollar businesses.96 
 The chromolithograph technique made it possible to produce thousands of full-color 
art reproductions at a moderate cost, which in turn made viable reproductions of oil paintings 
available to a large, image and status hungry, middle-class audience.97  The process of 
making a chromo was similar to black-and-white lithography, except that layers of 
transparent ink were used to build up a full range of color.98 Unlike modern processes that 
photomechanically isolate its color components, nineteenth-century chromo stones were 
manually drawn based upon human observation.  A chromiste, a skilled color lithographer, 
would determine how many tints and shades the original artwork involved, and using 
transfer paper to copy the image to each stone, would draw in only the parts of the picture 
that used a single chromatic element.  The finest chromolithographs, such as Thomas 
Moranʼs and Louis Prangʼs Yellowstone portfolio, were created from as many as fifty-six 
registered stones, and tremendous skill and precision was necessary for accurate results.99 
 In order to increase the verisimilitude of the print when reproducing an oil painting, 
the chromo was embossed with a canvas-like pattern, mounted on heavy fiberboard, and 
varnished in order to convincingly mimic the original workʼs distinguishing shine and 
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texture.100  Joni Kinsey asserts that unlike more “honest” forms of artistic reproduction, such 
as wood engravings and black-and-white lithographs, chromolithographs, “[w]ith their coats 
of varnish and gilt frames like those of fine oils, the modest prints were transformed into 
trompe lʼoeil facsimiles of the art they reproduced, fooling all but connoisseurs.”101  It was the 
chromoʼs highly illusionistic, arguably deceptive, appearance that sparked the culturally 
contentious chromo-controversy in the late nineteenth-century.   
The supporters of chromolithography advocated its democratic and anti-elitist 
potential, as an advertisement for L. Prang and Company, the national leader in the chromo 
industry, suggestively stipulated:  
PRANGʼS AMERICAN CHROMOS. ʻTHE DEMOCRACY OF ARTʼ . . . Our 
Chromo Prints are absolute FACSIMILES of the originals, in color, drawing, 
and spirit, and their price is so low that every home may enjoy the luxury of 
possessing a copy of works, which hitherto adorned only the parlors of the 
rich.102     
 
According to Michel Clapper, to their advocates, “chromos represented not 
only a triumph of art but also social justice and American political ideology through 
cultural achievement.”103  On the other hand, the flagrant deception of the chromo 
print prompted nineteenth-century art critic Clarence Cook (the same critic who 
admonished Harnettʼs trompe lʼoeil still life painting) to state, “[a] clever imitation is 
nothing but an imitation after all. It can teach nothing nor benefit anybody; and as 
every art has its own particular application and field of work, we hinder progress by 
every effort to wrest it to the cheap imitation of the results of some other art.”104  
Furthermore, E.L. Godkin, the sanctimonious editor of The Nation (the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Clapper, “ʼI Was Once a Barefoot Boy,ʼ” 18. 
101 Kinsey, Thomas Moranʼs West, 26. 
102 Boston Daily Advertiser, quoted in Prangʼs Chromo 1, no. 1 (January 1868), p. 1, as cited in Clapper, “ʼI Was 
Once a Barefoot Boy,ʼ” 20. 
103 Ibid, 21. 
104 Clarence Cook, “Fine Arts,” New York Daily Tribune, November 20, 1866, p. 6 col. I, as cited in Kinsey, 
Thomas Moranʼs West, p. 36. 
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publication that had previously praised the merits of multiplied art), acrimoniously 
coined the phrase “chromo-civilization” to describe the debasement of high culture in 
general.  Notably, the editorial utilizing the phrase did not reference 
chromolithography.105  The term “chromo” and its offspring “chromo-civilization,” thus 
came to acerbically characterize the highbrow condemnation of everything “mass 
produced, false, tasteless, and lacking in high moral value.”106   
Clapper, a chromolithograph scholar, asserts that the “critics [a]ttacked the 
chromolithographic process because the social functions of art were deemed too 
important to risk being tainted.”107  He locates this fear in the “mechanical, deceptive, 
and commercial” nature of the chromo, recognizing that each individual objection 
signified a “social concern [f]ar beyond [the prints] themselves.”108  In this sense, the 
anxiety surrounding the chromo (mechanical) reproduction reverberates the societal 
discord that stemmed from the volatile nature of paper money.  And as the United 
Statesʼ government enacted a counterfeit statute and instated the Secret Service to 
protect the value of its currency, federal copyright legislation can be viewed as an 
attempt to insure the value—both social and financial—of artistic production against 
cultural counterfeiting.  However, as the value of art is arguably more subjective than 
that of money, the struggle of the federal copyright statute to protect artistic 
production denotes not only the instability of the medium, but also the instability of 
society itself. 
 
Nineteenth-Century Copyright Statute: The Intricate Intersection of the Law, Monies 
and Popular Culture 	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Federal copyright statute was revised multiple times over the course of the century to 
accommodate the ever-evolving nature of intellectual property.  But as federal copyright law 
primarily sought to inspire artistic creation through the federal grant of limited monopolies 
(as states chartered corporations for the same reasons), its overt economic incentive shifted 
the nationʼs aesthetic ideology and identity.  In the United States copyright is part of federal 
law and its protection originates in the Constitution.  Although it is not expressly named this, 
Article 8, Section 8, Clause 8, has come to be known as the “Intellectual Property Clause,” 
because it states:  “The Congress shall have Power…to Promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”109  Even though copyright protection was 
probably not a primary consideration for the Framers of the Constitution, the language 
empowered Congress to introduce such doctrine into federal law as it became necessary.110  
And as the freshly emancipated country struggled to form its national identity, the U.S. 
Congress first exercised this Constitutional grant of authority by enacting The Copyright Act 
of 1790.  
The Copyright Act of 1790 granted rights only to U.S. authors (and their executors, 
administrators, and assigns) and was limited to the “printing, reprinting, publishing and 
vending” of maps, charts and books. It did not provide protection for any other type of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 United States Constitution, Article 8, Section 8, Clause 8.  According to Christopher Springman, this clause is 
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property” was unknown at the time of the framing of the Constitution.  The concept of intellectual property covers 
more than just patents and copyrights, but the term is useful in reference to the congressional power of the 
Constitutional clause because it captures both types of exclusive rights the clause specifically authorizes.  
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110David L Lang. and H. Jefferson Powell, No Law:  Intellectual Property in the Image of an Absolute First 
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Copyright law confers protection for expressive works such as those dealing with the arts, entertainment, or the 
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work—e.g. artwork.  The term of protection the Act offered was relatively short: it would be 
maintained for a fourteen-year term with the right of renewal for one additional fourteen-year 
term only if the author remained alive.  In addition, works would receive protection only if the 
author strictly adhered to its rigid statutory formalities, such as copyright registration and 
notice.  Given this narrowness, it was not until the late nineteenth century that the revised 
copyright law began to have a significant impact on American society.111  
Copyright law underwent a series of amendments and revisions during the 
nineteenth century, always in the direction of broadening the protection against unlicensed 
imitation.  The Copyright Act was amended in 1802 to extend copyright protection to those 
“[W]ho shall invent and design, engrave, etch, or work, or from his own works and 
inventions, shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched or worked, any historical or 
other print or prints.”112  Notably, the statute seemingly limits protection to printed imagery 
that falls within the didactic prescriptions of “high” art, as it expressly granted copyright to 
prints that replicated “historical” works of art—art already deemed to be art.  The statute was 
first revised with the Copyright Act of 1831, and as the new revision dropped the limiting 
language of “historical or other print or prints,” it broadened the scope of copyright protection 
to include those “[W]ho shall invent, design, etch, engrave, work, or cause to be engraved, 
etched, or worked from his own design, any print or engraving[.]”113    
By rejecting the limiting language of the 1802 amendment, the 1831 legislation subtly 
reflects artʼs egalitarian purpose in the early nineteenth century, as it explicitly broadened its 
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112 1802 Amendment (1802), “Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900),” L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, eds., 
www.copyrighthistory.org (retrieved June 28, 2012). 
113 Copyright Act, Washington D.C. (1831), “Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900),” L. Bently & M. 
Kretschmer, eds., www.copyrighthistory.org (retrieved June 28, 2012). 
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protection to include all mechanically produced art.114  The Copyright Act of 1870 further 
expanded the list of copyrightable items to include “[P]hotograph[s] or negative thereof, or of 
a painting, drawing, chromo, statute, statuary[,]” and by enumerating specific mediums, 
Congress statutorily included chromolithographs in the ambient of “works of fine art.”115   The 
1870 Act, however, recognized the potentially negative implications of extending copyright 
protection to these new mechanical mediums, and it tactically limited its protection to only, 
“[M]odels or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts[.]”116  The 1874 
amendment expanded this sentiment by stating:  “the words ʻEngraving,ʼ ʻcutʼ and ʻprintʼ 
shall be applied only to pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts, and no 
prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles or manufacture shall be entered 
upon the copyright law, but may be registered in the Patent Office.”117 
The evolution of nineteenth-century copyright legislation tangibly illustrates the 
countryʼs deeply conflicting cultural ideologies.  On one hand, copyright protection served as 
an elitist means of asserting individual economic control over culture.  On the other hand, 
the text of the 1870 Act, and the litigation decided under it, progressively increased the 
validity of “low” art forms, and legally authenticated mechanically produced and reproduced 
artwork.  The Supreme Courtʼs decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Company 
(1903) poignantly illustrates these competing notions, as it denotes the incongruities 
between the written law and judicial (arguably capitalistic) application.    
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In 1898, George Bleistein of the Cincinnati-based Courier Lithography Company 
sued the Kentucky-based Donaldson Lithography Company for copyright infringement.  
They alleged that Donaldson produced approximately 23,800 unauthorized copies of three 
chromolithograph posters advertising the Wallace Shows, a circus (fig. 7).  At issue in the 
case was whether Courierʼs chromolithograph designs, which were used strictly for 
advertising purposes, fell within the umbrella of copyright protection.  In 1903, the Supreme 
Court held that Courierʼs posters could indeed be protected under copyright law.  Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.ʼs infamous, and often quoted, majority opinion effectively codified 
mass-produced commercial prints as “high” art: 
[C]opyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the 
judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value- it would 
be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and education value- and the taste of any public 
is not to be treated with contempt (my emphasis).118  
 
Moreover, Justice Holmesʼ opinion tangibly demonstrates the intricate relationship between 
Americaʼs evolving socio-economic ideologies and the construction of its artistic/cultural 
tastes; Bleistein v. Donaldson and the textual evolution of nineteenth-century copyright 
statute thus illustrate the direct influence of money on the law, as well as the lawʼs complex 
relationship with art. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) 239, 251-52. See also, Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, “The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company: Originality as the Vehicle for 
Copyright Inclusivity,” Intellectual Property Stories, eds. Jane C. Ginsberg and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss (New 
York: Foundation Press, 2006), 77-109. 
 
	   	   37	  
	  
CHAPTER TWO:  Money, Marketplace, and the Conflicted Origins of the 
Copyright Act of 1909 
 
Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy. The copy is the 
personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. 
It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it 
something irreducible, which is one manʼs alone. That something he may copyright[.]119 
 
 
Bleistein v. Donaldson, and the eloquently pragmatic opinion of Justice Holmes, cited 
in Chapter One, is not only the apex of nineteenth-century copyright law and the consistently 
expanding scope of copyright protection, but is also, as I will argue, the theoretical precursor 
to Pop art and the work of Andy Warhol.  Furthermore, Justice Holmesʼ opinion can be 
viewed to evidence the complexity and hypocrisies of nineteenth-century consumer capitalist 
anxiety—an anxiety that is sardonically investigated in the work of the Pop artists.  As a 
prominent member of the American elite, Holmesʼ refusal to deny copyright protection to a 
commercial chromo illustrates not only the indivisibility of art, law and money, but also 
demonstrates the incongruity between the law and the fine arts.  Under the 1870 Act, 
chromos were provided copyright protection as “works of fine art,” however, the statute 
classified this protection by limiting it to works “intended to be perfected as fine arts.”  
Consequently, Holmesʼ refusal to deny copyright protection for the adversarial chromo 
legally elevated its aesthetic status to a “work of fine art” under the prevailing statute.  By 
equating commercial and fine art, Holmesʼ effectively neutralized the didactic impetus of 
mechanical reproduction and judicially authorized its purely economic value.120 
Justice Holmesʼ test of originality, whether the work exhibits “the personal reaction of 
an individual,” illustrates the contractions and inherent misgivings of the self-appointed and 	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self-interested “arbiters of taste.”121  To distinguish the Bleistein chromos from opposing 
precedent, and bolster his test of originality, Holmesʼ turned to one his favorite authors, 
prominent aesthete John Ruskin.  In his Supreme Court opinion he quoted Ruskin to state:  
“[i]f any young person, after being taught what is, in polite circles, called ʻdrawing,ʼ will try to 
copy the commonest piece of real work —suppose a lithograph on the title page of a new 
opera air, or a woodcut in the cheapest illustrated newspaper of the day – they will find 
themselves beaten.”122   Notably, Holmes overlooked the context of this statement, a 
beginning drawing lesson, and his use of Ruskin, a highly regard art critic noted for his  
“belie[f] [that] all chromos should be burned,” illustrates the confused nature of Holmesʼ 
aesthetic position.  According to legal historian Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Holmes saw 
the attack on the originality and inherent worth of circus posters both as a threat to great art 
that had as its subject matter the appearance of the real world or that might, by its very 
novelty and experimental qualities, seem to the uninitiated to be ugly and worthless.”123  
Rather than distinguish an uncopyrightable art form, Holmes issued an opinion that 
broadened not only the text of the 1870 Act (as revised in 1874), but as his opinion 
significantly the potential subject matter of copyright to include purely commercial objects, 
he also set the theoretical precedent for Pop art.   
After the case concluded, Justice Holmes glibly stated, “I fired off a decision 
upholding the cause of law and art and deciding that a poster for a circus representing 
decolletes and fat legged ballet girls could be copyrighted.  Harlan, that stout old 
Kentuckian, not exactly an esthete dissented for high art.”124  By simultaneously upholding 
the “cause of art” while scoffing at the non-esthete notion of “high art,” Holmesʼ opinion 
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collapsed the “high” and “low” aesthetic distinction in the legal field.  Combined with the 
expanded scope of the ensuing Copyright Act of 1909 (hereinafter “The 1909 Act”), 
copyright jurisprudence can be seen to anticipate the development of the nation.  And over 
the course of the twentieth century, as artists persistently questioned notions of originality, 
authorship and hierarchical designations, the relationship between copyright legislation and 
artistic production became increasingly antagonistic.  The serial, commercially stimulated 
imagery of Pop artist Andy Warhol can, I believe, be viewed to anticipate the inevitable clash 
between art and law.  Moreover, analyzing the course of Warholʼs education and career 
through the scope of the 1909 Act sheds a fascinating light not only on the artistʼs modus 
operandi, but also the often-hostile interaction between economics, market influence, and 
the legality of artistic production.  
 
The 1909 Act: Cheap Art & the Social Significance of Counterfeit Reproduction  
On its face, nineteenth-century copyright statute claimed to govern the realm of “fine 
arts” (amongst other creative endeavors).  However, its limited scope primarily protected the 
copyright holderʼs (often the publisherʼs) economic—versus creative—interests.  Thus, 
copyright did not protect the “work of fine art” for the benefit of the creator/author, but instead 
protected the work for the benefit of the market and the entrepreneur.125  To protect the 
rapidly expanding creative market, American copyright law, like that of its counterfeit 
statutes, developed from the administrative need to alleviate the anxiety caused by 
depreciating financial and social values by policing unauthorized counterfeit reproduction.126  	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Consequently, while on one hand the 1909 Act continued to democratize American art, with 
the art object statutorily indistinguishable the mundane mass-produced consumer good, the 
Act also sought to ensure the authenticity of American culture as attached to market value, 
by increasingly regulating the reproductive rights of the art-object.127 (a sentiment most 
evident in the Copyright Act of 1976). 
In addition to the numerous chromolithograph enterprises, at the turn of the century 
cheap paintings, also known as daubs, or inexpensive mass-produced oil works, became 
big business.  During the 1880s numerous manufacturing companies such as frame and 
molding manufactures) issued wholesale catalogs that “offered oil paintings of various 
subjects, sizes, and grades both framed and unframed.”128  While highbrow circles 
adamantly abhorred commercially produced art, cheap paintings and chromolithographs 
became the proud possessions of middle and working class families “eager to decorate their 
homes and simultaneously demonstrate their cultural standing and sophistication through 
the possession of original paintings.”129  As social designations became increasingly blurred, 
purchased objects, often mass-produced, became vital indicators of oneʼs social status, and 
according to art historian Samuel Zalesch, Gilded Age Americans “[c]limbed the ladders of 
social mobility by purchasing symbols of gentility.”130  As the definition and economic 
potential of works of art continued to expand, copyright legislation developed to underwrite 
the profitability of the creative market against the flood of counterfeit reproductions. 
As the art market rapidly developed, and the value of the art object steadily 
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no. 1 (March 1996), 77-78.    
129 Ibid, 80.  In addition, Zalesch asserts that the critical neglect of cheap paintings suggests a desire on the part 
of writers (etiquette books and household guides), to “appropriate,” or retain, art (and its appreciation) for the 
exclusive benefit of elite circles. Ibid, 78. 
130 Ibid, 82. 
	   	   41	  
	  
increased, counterfeit reproduction quickly ensued. Daubs were manufactured in three 
primary fashions: an assembly line of artists, an assembly line utilizing stencils to apply 
outlines and background colors, or by extremely expeditious artists painting standard 
subjects.131  Cheap paintings presented an interesting paradox: although they were mass-
produced by large-scale manufactures, they remained actual oil paintings in contrast to the 
printed chromo.  It is this contradiction that rendered daubs even more deceiving than the 
chromo, and several etiquette and household guides from the late nineteenth-century 
bemoaned their purchase.  One writer lauded chromos as “inexpensive gems of true art,” 
that are “[w]orth far more than a roomful of daubs[.]132  Indicative of oneʼs social status, like 
paper money, the fervent desire to own art objects manifested in the cultural knock-off or 
counterfeit reproduction.      
In Fake? The Art of Deception, Mark Jones describes the nineteenth century as the 
“great age of faking,” and asserts that the rise of forgery arose from the “mania for 
collecting” (as well as the lack of authentication).133  The insatiable demand for art objects, 
illustrated by the popularity of chromos and daubs, has thus been attributed to the rise of 
counterfeit, pictures bearing fake signatures of “modern masters,” artwork in the late 
nineteenth century.134  It is within this deceptive marketplace that authenticity and originality 
became crucial to the valuation of art objects, and tellingly, cheap painting proprietors 
promoted the sale of their goods by negating the previously the assembly line process of 
their production.  One prominent “picture factory” owner defensively insisted that all the 
paintings he sold were the work of a single artist, and exclaimed “No, they do not do parts of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Ibid. 94.  An 1889 article in Harperʼs Weekly identified five hands in the making of a cheap painting, and 
stated that duabs “require[d] no art at all” because their use of stencils. “The Pictures of Commerce,” Harperʼs 
Weekly 33 (May 18 1889), 403, as cited in Zalesch, “What Four Million Bought,” 94.  
132 The Housewifeʼs Library (no location, 1885), 454, as cited in Zalesch, “What Four Million Bought,” 82. It is 
noted that the same sentiment was expressed in How to Make a Happy Home (New York, 1884), 112. 
133 Mark Jones, ed., Fake? The Art of Deception (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1990), 162. 
134 Zalesch, “What Four Million Bought,” 96. 
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a picture, one putting in the sky, another the foreground, another the figures.  That is 
nonsense.  One man does the canvas throughout.”135      
    The essence of the capitalist process, pursuant to American economist Robert 
Heilbroner, is “the continuous transformation of capital-as-money into capital-as-
commodities,” and the subsequent “retransformation of capital-as-commodities into 
capital-as-money.”136  In accordance with Heilbronerʼs systematic analysis, as art 
commodities (chromos and cheap paintings) proliferated the market they made artwork 
accessible to a broader sector of the populace, thereby creating a popular demand for 
such works and competitive pricing.  Cheap paintings became so ubiquitous that trompe 
lʼoeil painter John Haberle, a contemporary of Harnett and fellow money painter, that 
they inspired a small series of works centered upon cheap landscape paintings.137  
Entitled Torn in Transit, these works depict a cheap painting shrouded in tattered 
remnants of packing material and postage stamps (fig. 8).  Illustrated in the same 
fashion as trompe lʼoeil money paintings, Haberle visually relates the cheap painting to 
paper money.  The illusionistic twine wrapped around the works surface emphasizes the 
flatness of the pictorial space, and the brown shipping paper melds seamlessly into the 
daubʼs canvas.  Moreover, as the work is plastered with colorful postage stamps and 
well-worn packing materials, Haberle visually placed the cheap painting in the stream of 
commerce, and its ragged appearance emphasized the art objectʼs exchangeability.   
As artworks were increasingly placed within the stream of commerce, the law 
increasingly intervened to protect the nationʼs economic interests and, similar to the 
enactment of its counterfeit statute, confidence in the value of its cultural production.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Ibid. 
136 Robert Heilbroner, The Nature and Logic of Capitalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1985), pp. 36-
38. 
137 Zalesch, “What Four Million Bought,” 78-80. 
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The progression of copyright statute, case law, and artistic production demonstrates the 
tenacious but influential nature of these relationships, as the regulatory nature of the law 
effectively reduced works of art to their ultimate commodity value:  money.  As 
technology rapidly developed to accommodate Americaʼs desire for cultural and 
consumer objects, and President Theodore Roosevelt appealed to Congress to “update 
and modernize” its copyright statute:   
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition, confused and 
inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles which, under modern 
reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon the copyright 
proprietor which are not essential to the fair protection of the public; they are difficult for the 
courts to interpret and impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with satisfaction to the 
public (emphasis added).138 
 
In accordance with this request Congress radically revised the prevailing copyright 
legislation.  On February 15 (calendar day, February 17) 1909, New Hampshire 
Representative Frank Dunklee Currier introduced House Report 28192, and accompanied 
by the report of the Committee on Patents on February 22nd, President Theodore Roosevelt, 
as one of his last official acts, on March 4th signed the general revision of U.S. copyright 
law.139 
The 1909 Act extended copyright protection to a broader variety of industrially 
produced goods and reproductive processes.140  Premised upon the nationʼs need to protect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Copyright Law Revisions: Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on 
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 1960. 86th Cong., 1st sess., S. Res. 53, 1, 
http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study4.pdf (accessed November 22, 2011). 
139 Ibid. 
140 See Copyright Act of 1909. U.S. Statutes at large 60-349 (1909), §§ 1-5, 
http://www.megalaw.com/top/copyright/1909/1909ch1.php (accessed November 21, 2011):  Section 5—
Classification of works for registration, the application for registration shall specify to which of the following 
classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs (emphasis added): 
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations. 
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers. 
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery). 
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions. 
(e) Musical compositions. 
(f) Maps. 
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art. 
(h) Reproductions of a work of art. 
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character. 
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objects based on “[t]he progress of [their] commercial development,” copyright legislation 
echoes the ideology of the nineteenth-century counterfeit statute: as the counterfeit statute 
attempts to solidify the value of national currency through stringent government regulation, 
copyright statute struggled to solidify the value of American culture.141  And just as 
counterfeit currency generated social anxiety in the nineteenth-century, Americaʼs fear of the 
“copy” became manifest in the artistic production—and its ensuing legislative protection—of 
the twentieth-century.  
The phrasing of the 1909 Act reduced the elitist notion of “fine art”—as worded in 
nineteenth-century copyright statutes—to the more egalitarian “works of art.”  The removal 
of the “fine” preface, when read collectively with the extended list of enumerated 
copyrightable “works” (see footnote 140), illustrates the vacillating definition of art in 
American society.142 In addition to the expanded definition, the 1909 Act also enhanced the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(j) Photographs. 
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles of merchandise. 
(l) Motion-picture photoplays. 
(m) Motion pictures other than photoplays. 
(n) Sound recordings. 
141 Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Copyright Law Revision: 
Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1960, p. 75.  The thought process behind the expansion of copyrightable objects is 
illustrated in the arguments for the protection of composers against unauthorized mechanical reproduction of 
music. In the minority view of the preliminary report (later adopted into the final report) it is stated:  “If it is proper 
to extend copyright protection to these technical forms of reproducing music, an express provision should be 
inserted in the law. That was the course adopted when the improvement of photography made a change in the 
law necessary. Photographs and the negatives thereof were expressly added to the list of subjects of copyright.” 
Ibid. 
142 Legislating the ephemeral definition of “art” has also been problematic for the United Statesʼ Customs Court, 
as seen in Constantine Brancusi v. United States (1927), No. 209109, held in U.S. Customs Court, Third 
Division. At issue was whether Brancusiʼs bronze sculpture, Bird in Space, was an original work of art and 
entitled to duty-free entry into the United States. Under paragraph 1704 of the 1922 Tariff Act, the duty-free 
importation of works of art included “original sculptures or statuary.” The U.S. customs officials who ensnared the 
sculpture, however, did not consider the object to be an “original sculpture”, and instead classified the object as a 
“lump of bronze” under paragraph 39 of the Tariff Act: “Articles or wares not specially provided for, if composed 
wholly or in chief value of platinum, gold or silver[.]” Thomas Jones, an expert witness for the customs office, 
testified the Bird was “too abstract and a misuse of the form of sculpture” (the court also wrestled with the issue 
of “originality”). Fortunately, the court ruled in favor of Brancusi, and Justice Waites stated, “The object under 
consideration…is beautiful and symmetrical in outline…and we hold under the evidence that it is the original 
production of a professional sculptor and is in fact a sculpture[.]  For more information see: Laurie Adams, Art on 
Trial: From Whistler to Rothko (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), 35-58, Stephanie Giry, “An Odd Bird,” 
Legal Affairs: The Magazine at the Intersection of Law and Life (September/October 2002), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2002/story_giry_sepoct2002.msp (accessed April 17, 
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author-creatorʼs copyright monopoly. By extending the “right to copy” to all copyright holders 
it assertively, although probably unwittingly, regulated unlicensed third-party—counterfeit—
reproduction of art (cultural) objects.143      
Section 1(a) of the 1909 Act extended a copyright ownerʼs rights by stipulating that 
“[a]ny person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the 
exclusive right: (a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyright work” (emphasis 
added).144  Even though the 1870 Act (and its subsequent revisions) provided the copyright 
owner with “the sole liberty of . . . copying (emphasis added)[,]” as technology progressed, 
the practical application of the 1909 Actʼs right to copy drastically expanded the scope of 
federal copyright protection.145  Section 41 of the 1909 Act clarifies this discrepancy by 
stipulating: 
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted, and the 
sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material object shall not of itself 
constitute a transfer of the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the copyright 
constitute a transfer of the title to the material object; but nothing in this Act shall be 
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work 
the possession of which has been lawfully obtained.146  
 
While the House report denotes that section 41 separated copyright from the material object 
copyrighted in order to protect user rights, practically speaking, it prevented users—at trial, 
typically competitors—from making reproductions. As such, by treating the term “copy” in a 
general sense (as a verb and not a noun), the 1909 Act prompted a questionable legal 
doctrine:  that the right to copy a work is exclusive and absolute.147     
The progression of the United Statesʼ copyright statute, from its inception in 1790 to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2011), and Thomas L. Hartshorne, “Modernism on Trial: C. Brancusi v. United States,” Journal of American 
Studies 20, no. 1 (April 1986), pp. 93-104. 
143 Patterson & Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Userʼs Rights, 81.  
144  Copyright Act of 1909. U.S. Statutes at large 60-349 (1909), §1(a), 
http://www.megalaw.com/top/copyright/1909/1909ch1.php (accessed November 21, 2011). 
145 Copyright Act, Washington D.C. (1870), “Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900),” L. Bently & M. 
Kretschmer, eds., www.copyrighthistory.org (retrieved June 28, 2012) 
146 Copyright Act, Washington D.C. (1909), http://law.copyrightdata.com/index.php (accessed July 1, 2012)  
147 Patterson & Linberg, The Nature of Copyright, 83-85. 
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the 1909 Act, illustrates the American legal systemʼs escalating distrust of mass-production.  
As the scope of federal copyright protection expanded to incorporate more copyrightable 
objects, it systematically vested the copyright owner(s) with stringent control, basically an 
individual monopoly over its reproduction.  Artistic production thus became increasingly 
privatized, and as the economic incentive motivating copyright jurisprudence became more 
pervasive, evidenced by the extended length of copyright duration and the numerous 
ensuing infringement suits, works of art became increasingly integrated to the realm of 
commercial production.  And, according to artist and critic Suzi Gablik, during the twentieth-
century artistic production came to represent a “bureaucratic, managerial type of culture 
characterized by mass consumption and economic self-seeking.”148    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Suzi Gablik, Has Moderinism Failed: Revised Edition (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 26.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  Pop Art, Andy Warhol, and the Aesthetic Limitations the 
Copyright Act of 1909       
 
I adore America and these are some impersonal comments on it. My image is a statement of 
the symbols of the harsh, impersonal products and brash materialistic objects on which 
America is built today. It is a projection of everything that can be bought and sold, the practical 
but impermanent symbols that sustain us.149 
 
 
It is within this legal and cultural milieu that Andy Warhol entered the New York art 
scene.  While Warholʼs oeuvre has been viewed as both a reaction against high modernism 
and as a critical response to American consumerism, his serial display of mundane 
consumer products can be seen to sardonically parody Americaʼs fear of counterfeit 
reproduction.  Through his use of the mechanical silk-screen process appropriated 
photographic images, Warhol pithily reproduced copyrighted and trademarked objects of 
“low” consumer culture.  Although he never intended to foist the objects he reproduced, such 
as the Brillo boxes, as “originals,” he did intend for these objects to be placed into the realm 
of fine art.  Warhol, to the admonishment of many of the cultural elite, effectively created an 
innovative form of counterfeit art.   
Interestingly, Warhol appropriated the “low” subject matter and representational 
renderings (albeit without the same degree of illusionism) of the popular, yet denigrated, 
nineteenth-century trompe lʼoeil painters.  Bruce Chambers, has noted the resurgence of 
popular and scholarly interest in trompe lʼoeil money paintings during the late 1980s.  He 
notes that by the 1950s, a “[f]resh appreciation of the artifacts of popular culture” developed, 
largely due to the significance attributed to still life imagery by Dada and Surrealist artists.150  
Moreover, Chambers attributes the twentieth-century interest in trompe lʼoeil money 
paintings to the revival of a “gilded age” culture, as “[o]ur own passion for and about money 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Andy Warhol, “Artistʼs Comment,” special issue “New Talent USA,” Art in America 50, no. 1 (1962), 42. 
150 Chambers, Old Money, 16. 
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is a major reason for our growing intrigue with the [trompe lʼoeil] money painters.”151   
Although a direct connection between Warhol and the money painters of the 
nineteenth-century is speculative, there is well-documented evidence detailing the 
overarching influence of money in Warholʼs artistic career.  Notably, Warhol created money 
paintings throughout the course of his career: as a commercial illustrator in the 1950s (Fig. 
14), in his career as a fine artist during the 1960s (Fig. 18), and as a business-artist in the 
1980s (Fig. 25).  Warhol flamboyantly amassed a personal fortune through his mass-
production of unlicensed images of popular culture, and arguably, his extravagance 
motivated a series of copyright suits in the mid-1960s.  The progression of Warholʼs “money 
paintings” thus depicts not only a satirical account of American culture (what is commonly 
advocated by scholars), but also connects his artistic production to the evolving trajectory of 
copyright jurisprudence. Analyzing Warholʼs art education and commercial and fine art 
careers through the lens of the presiding 1909 Act will shed light not only on the artistʼs 
modus operandi, but also the narcissistic interaction between economics, market influence 
and the legality of artistic production. 
 According to sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, “[t]he law [represents] the quintessential 
form of "active" discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects. It would not be 
excessive to say that it creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is the world 
that first creates the law.”152  As such, to appreciate the relationship between artistic 
production and copyright legislation, one must first consider the cultural and legal 
atmosphere that stimulated Warholʼs artistic development.  As Gablik has theorized, when 
the elitist notion of American artistic production dwindled into capitalistic drivel during the 
mid-twentieth century, influential art critic Clement Greenberg ardently fought to reclaim 	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152 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” Hastings Law Journal 38 
(July 1987), 838. 
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artistic autonomy and redefine the blurred hierarchical boundaries between high and low 
culture (fine and commercial/popular art).  In his 1960 essay “Modernist Painting,” 
Greenberg reclaimed the term “Modernism” to represent a “pure” and autonomous fine 
(high) art: 
The task of self-criticism became to eliminate from the effects of each art any and every effect 
that might conceivably be borrowed from or by the medium of any other art.  Thereby each art 
would be rendered ʻpureʼ, and in its ʻpurityʼ find the guarantee of its standards of quality as well 
as its independence.”153  
 
Modernism thus came to signify a visually and intellectually challenging “high art,” 
epitomized by the work of Jackson Pollock, that was both spiritually and culturally 
segregated from modern societyʼs duplicitous capitalistic motivations.  Consequently, 
hierarchical designations were solidified by cultural tastes, and just as fine art was 
segregated from commercial art, the art object was elevated above the denigrated consumer 
good. 
 The indexical gestural marks of Pollock and other Abstract Expressionist artists not 
only visually separated fine art from popular culture, but also defended it against counterfeit 
reproduction.  Times Magazine art critic Robert Hughes declared “[i]t [to be] impossible to 
make a forgery of Pollockʼs work,” because imitations “always end up looking…like 
spaghetti, whereas Pollock—in his best work—had an almost preternatural control over the 
total effect of those skeins and receding depths of paint.”154  As exemplified in Number 1, 
1950 (Lavender Mist) (Fig. 9), not only did the intricately laced skeins of his mature drip 
paintings deny the visual formation of discernible contours and an accessible compositional 
axis, they also moved the work beyond the profit margins of capitalist reproduction.155  As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” Art and Literature, no. 4 (Spring 1965), 194: 
Realistic, illusionist art had dissembled the medium, using art to conceal art. Modernism used art to call attention 
to art. 
154 Robert Hughes, “An American Legend in Paris,” Time 119, no. 5 (February 1982): 76.   
155  Hal Foster et. al., 1945 to the Present, vol. 2 of Art Since 1900: Modernism, Antimodernism, Postmodernism 
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such, the work of Abstract Expressionist artists mitigated the damage of the popular 
counterfeit by elevating societyʼs definition of “works of art,” and, as will I will contend in 
Chapter Three, it is this ideology that is specifically incorporated in the Copyright Act of 
1976. 
Despite the formalists attempt to segregate high culture, Americaʼs multifarious 
popular culture resisted this demarcation.  In the post-war consumer boom of 1949, Life 
Magazine posed the question “Is he [Jackson Pollock] the greatest living painter in the 
United States (Fig. 10)?”156 In this article, colorful reproductions of Pollockʼs paintings are 
sandwiched between vibrant advertisements for luxury Ford automobiles, decadent 
cheeses, and alluring shaving cream.  Mass-produced color copies of Pollockʼs “works of 
art” thus became cohesively integrated with images of Americaʼs commodity culture.  By 
asking the rhetorical question, Life effectively dictated the parameters of good taste to the 
masses, and the popular publication relegated Pollockʼs paintings to the realms of consumer 
culture.  
 Four years after the Life Magazine spread, the United Stateʼs Supreme Court 
judicially mandated an increasingly democratic definition of “works of art.”  In Mazer v. Stein 
(1954), the Supreme Court determined federal copyright protection of a utilitarian mass-
produced statuette to be constitutional (fig. 11).  In defense of their copyright, the 
Respondents stipulated that they created “original works of sculpture in the form of human 
figures by traditional clay-model technique.”157  The Art Deco inspired statuette was 
submitted to the United Stateʼs Copyright Office for registration without electronic 
components as a “wor[k] of art,” however, it was originally sold as a fully embodied lamp.   
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157 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), http://digital-law-online.info/cases/100PQ325.htm (accessed, November 
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The Plaintiffs, competitor lamp manufacturers, copied the Defendantʼs statuette 
without permission and also sold them as fully embodied lamps.158  In their petition for 
certiorari, the Plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court one question:  “[c]an statuettes be 
protected in the United States by copyright when the copyright applicant intended primarily 
to use the statuettes in the form of lamp bases to be made and sold in quantity and carried 
the intentions into effect?”159  The Supreme Court upheld Steinʼs copyright; predicating its 
decision upon relevant case law, and an analysis of the governing 1909 Act and its 
legislative history.   
In addition to the continuously expanding list of copyrightable objects (Section Five, 
see footnote 140), the 1909 Act provided the first “catch-all phrase” in copyright law.  In 
Section Four Congress arguably expanded the scope of copyright protection to its full 
constitutional limits by stipulating, “all writings of author [are] included,” and, “The works for 
which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all the writing of an author 
(emphasis added).”160  Furthermore, following the enumerated list of copyrightable objects, 
Section 5 states that, “The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter 
of copyright as defined in Section 4 of this title[.]”  When read together, Sections 4 and 5 
allows copyright protection to specifically contour to the developing needs of Americaʼs 
cultural market.  The progression of copyright law thus seems not to be based upon whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Ibid. Argued February 3, 1953 
159 Ibid.  The plaintiffs asserted in their reply brief that copyright does not cover industrial reproduction, and is 
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160 1909 Copyright Act, “Section 4—All writings of author included,” 
http://www.megalaw.com/top/copyright/1909/1909_4.php (accessed February 11, 2012).  Moreover, in a report 
accompanying the final draft of the bill as passed, it was stated that:  “Section 4 is declaratory of existing law. It 
was suggested that the word “works” should be substituted for the word “writings”, in view of the broad 
construction given by the courts to the word “writings”, but it was thought better to use the word “writings”, which 
is the word found in the Constitution. The report also notes “Congress and the courts have always given a liberal 
construction to the ʻwritingsʼ.”  Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 
Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, 
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960, p. 74.   
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a particular object could be protected, but upon whether it “needed protection because of the 
progress of its commercial development.”161  On this legal basis, Justice Reed theorized, in 
his opinion for Mazer v. Stein, that the “[i]ndividual perception of the beautiful is too varied a 
power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art.”162  By determining a lamp base to be a 
copyrightable “work of art,” Mazer v. Stein further expanded the legal definition of art, and 
specifically situated “works of art” according to their legal status amongst popular, mass-
produced, commodity goods.  As such, I assert that by analyzing the course of Warholʼs 
education and artistic career, through the lens of the presiding 1909 Act, will shed light on 
the artistʼs modus operandi and the self-conscious interaction between economics, market 
influence and the legality of artistic production.  
 
Andy Warhol: Commercial Beginnings and Financial Success 
It is within the fluctuating artistic, social and legal atmosphere of mid-century America 
that Andy Warhol began his artistic career.  Andrew Warhola was born in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, on August 6, 1928.  His parents, Andrej and Julia Warhola, were working 
class Rusyn emigrants from Mikó (located today in northeastern Slovakia).  As a child, 
Warhol took free art classes at the Carnegie Institute (now The Carnegie Museum of Art), 
and subsequently attended Carnegie Institute of Technology (now Carnegie Mellon 
University) from 1945-49, earning a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree in Pictorial Design.163 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Copyright Law Revision, 75. 
162 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), 214. Justice Reedʼs opinion notes the difference in Congressʼ phrasing 
of copyrightable subject matter in the 1909 Act, “Works of art,” and the 1870 Act, “[s]tatue, statuary, and models 
or designs intended to be perfected as works of fine art.” He goes on to state, “[t]he court once essayed to fix the 
limits of fine art. That effort need not be raised in relation to this copyright issue . . . Herbet Putnam, Esq., then 
Librarian of Congress and active in the movement to amend the copyright laws, told the join meeting of the 
House and Senate Committees: ʻThe term ʻworks of artʼ is deliberately intended as a broader specification than 
ʻworks of fine artsʼ in the present statute with the idea that there is subject-matter (for instance, of applied design, 
not yet within the province of design patents), which may properly be entitled to protection under the copyright 
law.ʼ” Ibid, 209-13.    
163 “Andy Warhol Biography,” the warhol:,  http://www.warhol.org/collection/aboutandy/biography/ (accessed 
February 13, 2012). 
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While at Carnegie Tech, Warhol was a student in Robert Lepperʼs course “Pictorial 
Design.”  The course was designed around seven coordinated problems:  the first half of the 
two-year course was spent collecting and analyzing “objective” data in order to generate the 
“general viewpoint of a cultural anthropologist; ” the second half of the course was devoted 
to “subjective data,” whereby students gathered facts about the “molding influences” of their 
own personalities.164  In a 1948 report on the teaching techniques used in the course, 
Lepper stated his educational motives as follows: 
The pictorial artist is concerned with the perception and projection of meaningful experience. A 
greater portion of meaningful experience stems from the social flux by which is meant the ever-
changing relation of the individual to the community of which he is a member. A formal study of 
this flux and of its components is important to him in its potential for broadening his field for 
pictorial expression.165  
 
As a whole, the course was intended to give the general “effect of increasing sharpness of 
observation and retention of data,” and to have students “produce a single work of art that 
was socially and historically conscious and personally meaningful.”166  
 Lepper significantly contributed to the reframing of Carnegieʼs Techʼs mission during 
his tenure.  Carnegie Tech, like many schools of the time, ascribed to the teaching methods, 
social ambitions, and “artist-cum-engineer professional ethos” of the Bauhaus pedagogy.167  
In a 1940 article, Lepper explained his beliefs and interests in a “vulgar art:” 
Our common art is really common . . . so much a part of life that the scholarly critic might easily 
miss it . . . the paraphernalia of the railroads and of building industry, aviation and the 
automobile, all of these mobile sculpture. Add the highway system and all the thousands of 
utensils, tools, instruments and appliances that are the common equipment of the farmer, 
craftsman and housewife . . . It is submitted that the vast majority of these structures are 
genuine, earnest and obviously vulgar (common); that they possess an honest dignity, are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Robert Lepper, “Processes in Professor Lepperʼs Course in Pictorial Design,” Depart of Painting and Design, 
ts. Aug. 1948, Lepper archive, box 2. ff. 51, 1, as cited in Blake Stimson, “And Warholʼs Red Beard” The Art 
Bulletin 83, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), 531. For the final project, Warhol and his fellow students were asked to work with 
Robert Penn Warrenʼs 1946 novel, All the Kingʼs Men. The novel has been interpreted to make allusion to the 
populist leader and 1930s Louisiana governor and senator Huey Long. The novel was a general allegory of the 
intellectual culture of the 1930s, and the narrative focused “complex psychological identification of an upper-
middle-class intellectual with the populism and mass politics of the period.” 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid, 533. Lepperʼs generation came to age with art forms developed by the Social realists, Mexican muralists, 
and Bauhaus-influenced industrial designers of the 1930s that drew their sense of meaning and purpose from 
“proletarian labor and industrial production.” Ibid. 
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democratic, constructive, experimental, . . . developed out of life . . . and supported by popular 
approval.168     
 
Out of these populist artistic values, Lepper cultivated a system of associations between the 
requisite formal properties of visual artists and their industrial equivalents (Fig. 12).  
According to Lepper, the artist constructed a “work of art” out of “line, area, and volume” 
similar to industrial laborers who construct a machine out of “wire, sheet metal, and 
casings.”169    
 As a student, Warhol was asked to ascribe to and achieve the aforementioned social 
values, whereby artistic success was predicated upon the ability to achieve a functional 
“paraphernalia of the railroads” value.  Warhol, however, arrived at Carnegie Tech with 
generationally inspired theories of art in regards to its public function and sources of 
legitimation.  Like his professor, he subscribed to a form of aesthetic populism in which “high 
art” was indistinguishable from low, mass-produced culture.  Warholʼs populist mentality, 
however, rather than motivated by Lepperʼs “industrial equivalents” or “artist-cum-worker” 
ideology, emerged from the childlike innocence—although sardonically synthetic—he 
adopted in order to shield from the surrounding world.170 
 While at Carnegie Tech, Warhol carefully crafted his childish persona as the impish, 
yet innocent, “class baby.”  In the role of “child-adult” he could address and manipulate adult 
themes and situations without bearing adult responsibility, that is, until he faced legal 
consequences in the 1960s.171  I argue that this superficial anonymity provided Warhol with 
the confidence to work outside of the conceptually constrictive formal, social and legal 
codes.  
 After graduating from Carnegie Tech in 1949, Warhol moved to New York City to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Robert Lepper, “Comments on a Vulgar Art,” Architectural Forum (May 1940), 350, as cited in Stimson, “Andy 
Warholʼs Red Beard,” p. 533. 
169 Stimson, “Andy Warholʼs Red Beard,” p. 533-4. 
170  Ibid, 534. 
171 Ibid, 539. 
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pursue a career as a commercial artist; his work debuted in Glamour magazine in 
September of the same year.172   He went on to become an extremely successful 
commercial artist, and throughout the 1950s he worked for several high-class clients ranging 
from Vogue and Harperʼs Bazaar to Bergdorf Goodman and Bonwit Teller.  In addition, 
Warhol designed album covers for Columbia records, Christmas cards, book jackets, and 
department store windows, and created several retail campaigns, including the famous shoe 
advertisements for I. Miller in the mid-1950s.173    
In December 1956, the Bodley Gallery, a New York City art gallery who featured 
several of Warholʼs early exhibitions, displayed his shoe art in an exhibition titled “Andy 
Warhol: The Golden Slipper Show or Shoes Shoe in America.”  The exhibition consisted of 
shoes named after celebrities, and tellingly, Life Magazine reprinted some of the work in a 
two-page spread in their January 21, 1957 issue (Fig. 13).  Eight years after Lifeʼs article on 
Pollock, Warholʼs illustrations were displayed amongst the same type of commercial 
advertisements featured in the Pollock issue.  Unlike the Pollock exposé, the validity of 
Warholʼs commercial work—notably, not referred to as “art” by Life—was not questioned, 
and the prominently displayed illustrations were lauded as being “eagerly bought up for 
decoratio[n].”174   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 “Andy Warhol Biography,” the warhol:,  http://www.warhol.org/collection/aboutandy/biography/ (accessed 
February 13, 2012). 
173 Paul Alexander, Death and Disaster: The Rise of the Warhol Empire and the Race for Andyʼs Millions (New 
York: Villard Books, 1994), 25. By hiring Warhol as their sole illustrator, I. Miller was attempting to modernize 
their image through innovative graphic design. According to Geraldine Stutz, I. Millerʼs vice-president, it was the 
start of an era when one “sold the sizzle and not the steak,” I Miller was selling a life style, not just shoes.  The I. 
Miller ads featured stylized versions of their shoes rather than facsimile reproductions. Repetition was sometimes 
employed to emphasize a product—advertisement proclaiming “the well-heeled look on fashion” featured 
Warholʼs drawings of heels repeated across the ad (emphasis added). Ibid. 
174 “Crazy Golden Slippers: Famous People Inspire Fanciful Footwear,” Life Magazine 42, no. 3 (January 21, 
1957), 12-13.  The two-page spread of “pictures,” is accompanied by brief descriptions of the footwear, for 
example, “James Dead inspired spurred western boot to convey a rugged character, though he never made 
cowboy movies.” In addition, Life provides a brief explanation of the exhibition: “[w]hile drawing shoes for 
advertisements, Andy Warhol, a commercial artist, became fascinated with their designs and began to sketch 
imaginary footwear as a hobby. His work grew more and more ornate until completed with some 40 slippers 
made entirely of gold leaf ornamented with candy-box decorations. Each was created to symbolize a well-known 
personality (emphasis added).” Ibid.  Notably, Life avoids calling Warholʼs “pictures” art, and by labeling Warhol a 
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The “Crazy Golden Slippers” works were priced between fifty and two hundred and 
twenty-five dollars apiece.175  At the height of his career as a commercial artist, Warhol was 
earning a staggering one hundred thousand dollars a year (on the I. Miller account alone he 
made fifty thousand dollars one year).176  In 1957, shortly after the lucrative shoe illustrations 
and during a period of personal wealth, he created Money Tree (Fig. 14). The illustration can 
be seen as an early example of Warholʼs money painting, a theme that he consistently 
revisited throughout his expansive career.  The piece depicts a whimsical polka-dotted tree, 
blossoming with plumes of symbolic, non-denominational, paper currency.     
Typical of Warholʼs commercial work, Money Tree was created in his hallmark 
blotted line technique, one he started using in college to make his work look “printed.”177  A 
drawing was first made in lead on water resistant Strathmore paper.  The lines were then 
retraced with black ink on top of the lead, and the paper wetted.  While the drawing was wet, 
it was pressed onto a second sheet.  The first printed sheet thus became the “original” print.  
The process could be repeated indefinitely, and carried out by another person if desired.  
Critics have considered this method of drawing, essentially a graphic process for 
mechanically multiplying or reproducing an artistʼs drawings, to be the first step in Warholʼs 
adoption of mechanical reproductive processes.178 
Poking fun at the popular idiom “money doesnʼt grow on trees,” Warholʼs early 
illustration sardonically characterized his ability to both earn, and create, vast sums of 
money.  By creating easily reproducible illustrations, Warhol capitalized upon his commercial 
success, while at the same time mischievously prodding the inscribed social- and eventually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“commercial artist,” it distinguishes his work from the artist-genius of Pollock (“Is he the greatest living painter in 
the United States”).  
175 Ibid, 13. 
176 Alexander, Death and Disaster, 25. 
177 Bennard B. Perlman, “The Education of Andy Warhol,” in The Andy Warhol Museum (New York: Distributed 
Art Publishers, 1994), 148. 
178 Rainer Crone, “Form and Ideology: Warholʼs Techinques from Blotted Line to Film,” The Work of Andy 
Warhol: Dia Foundation Discussions in Contemporary Culture Number 3 (Seattle: Bay Press, 1989), 74-76. 
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legal—boundaries of “works of art.”  While the idiom cautions consumers to spend carefully, 
in Warholʼs world, money, the ultimate commodity, literally “grows on trees,” whereby every 
mechanical reproduction becomes a tangible dollar amount.  By the end of 1958, Warhol 
was so successful as a commercial artist that in a novelty book entitled 1001 Names and 
Where to Drop Them, he was listed under “Fashion” rather than “Artists.”179 
 
Andy Warhol: Pop Art and The Commodification of Fine Art  
Richard Hamilton, a British Pop artist, defined “Pop Art [as]: Popular (designed for a 
mass audience). Transient (short-term solution). Expendable (easily-forgotten). Low cost. 
Mass produced. Young (aimed at youth). Witty. Sex. Gimmicky. Glamorous. Big Business 
(emphasis added)[.]”180  Pop art reached the United States in the early sixties, and its arrival 
brought Clement Greenbergʼs previously mentioned cultural fears to fruition, as it brazenly 
blurred the hierarchical divide between fine art and popular culture.  As Pop art deified the 
commodity object and manipulated the external signs of Americaʼs capitalist society, its 
overt representational nature castrated Greenberg formal definition of “pure” art.181   
Rebelling against the manifestation of the internal psychological state of Abstract 
Expressionism, Pop art illustrates how, in a consumerist and technologically advancing 
economy, objects and images tend to become “serial and simulacral.”182  Warholʼs 
automated “fine” art and constructed persona illustrates his embrace of the repetitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 “Andy Warhol and Pat Hackett, POPism: The Warhol Sixties (New York: Harcourt Inc., 1980), 14.  
180 Richard Hamilton, Letter to Alison and Peter Smithson, January 16, 1957, in cited in Foster, “Survey,” Pop: 
Themes and Motives, edited by Mark Francis, 15.  The term “Pop Art” is attributed to British art critic, Lawrence 
Alloway, who stated in 1949: “The term refers to the use of popular art courses by fine artists: movie stills, 
science fiction, advertisements, game boards, heroes of the mass media.”  Lawrence Alloway, “Pop Art Since 
1949” The Listener 67, no. 1761 (Dec. 27, 1962), 1085. 
181 Diana Crane, The Transformation of the Avant-Garde: The New York Art World, 1940-1985 (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 64, and Marco Livingstone, Pop Art: A Continuing History (New 
York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1990), 19. 
182 Hal Foster, The First Pop Age: Painting and Subjectivity in the Art of Hamilton, Lichtenstein, Warhol, Richter, 
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consumerist landscape.  Infamously stipulating, “Everybody should be a machine,” Warhol 
adamantly perpetuated the “compulsive habits of repetition enforced by a late capitalist 
society of serial production and consumption.”183 
In 1961, Warhol displayed his first works of “fine art” at the locus of American 
consumer culture, in a widow display for the exclusive New York City department store 
Bonwit Teller (Fig. 15).184  While the department store employed many prominent artists to 
style their window displays, from Salvador Dali to Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg, 
Warhol was the first to utilize the window space to exhibit his latest paintings at the 
prominent locale on the fashionable intersection of Fifth Avenue and 57th Street, which 
effectively introduced his “fine” art to the public, and led to his first contact with an art 
dealer.185  
The canvases Warhol displayed in the Bonwit Teller window appropriated imagery 
from American popular culture: works based on small newspaper ads and comic book 
illustrations.186  According to Warholʼs archive, his early comic book appropriations, such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Ibid, 110.  
184 Mass wholesaling emerged as a significant business practice in the 1850s, and reached the height of its 
development just after 1880. The department store assumed its modern form in the 1870s, and the elegant large-
scale buildings—the largest in New York—visibly evidence that selling had become a new type of activity. These 
retailers bought in volume, sold cheap, had hundreds of employees, and served tens of thousands of customers. 
For further information on the development of Americaʼs “selling culture” see Ohmann, Selling Culture, 66-67. 
185 Francis, Pop, 85. 
186 Warhol and Roy Lichtenstein simultaneously created their comic book artwork in New York City, but neither 
artist admits to being aware of the others work. Ted Carey, one of Warholʼs assistants, portrayed the following 
account of this situation:  “[s]o, I went home and called Andy - no, I think, I went right over to Andy's house... and 
so, I said, 'Prepare yourself for a shock.' And he said, 'What?' I said, 'Castelli has a closet full of comic paintings.' 
And he said, 'You're kidding?!' And he said, 'Who did them?' And I said, 'Somebody by the name of Lichtenstein.' 
Well, Andy turned white. He said, 'Roy Lichtenstein.' He said, 'Roy Lichtenstein used to... ' - as I remember, he 
used to be a sign painter for Bonwit Teller... the implication was: Andy felt that Lichtenstein had seen the 
paintings in the window and gave him the idea to do his paintings. Now, whether this is true or not, I don't know, 
but at this time, this is what Andy had felt.”  There is a scholarly debate as to whether Lichtenstein copied 
Warholʼs comic book imagery, as Warhol momentarily believed. Warhol was the first to create a single-cell, with 
speech bubble paintings, and as the paintings were displayed in a public locale, it is probable that Lichtenstein 
would have had access to the work (although this is denied by Lichtenstein).  Interestingly, Warhol displayed a 
Popeye painting in the Bonwit Teller window and Lichtensteinʼs subsequent painting of the same subject included 
a copyright symbol, alongside the artistʼs monogram and date of the painting. Moreover, the copyright symbol is 
duplicated in the formal elements of the opened can of spinach, located directly above previously mentioned 
symbol, and I assert that this blatant assertion of copyright ownership may be in response to Warholʼs 
accusations of copying. Lichtenstein was the first to be represented by an agent, and upon seeing Warholʼs 
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Superman (Fig. 16), combined the influence of multiple frames (rather than copying one 
concrete image), and retain traces Abstract Expressionist painterliness, seen in the self-
conscious drips and crayon drawing.187  Warhol quickly abandoned this personalized 
aesthetic, however, in favor of the reproductive techniques of commercial advertisement.   
Compounding the duplicative nature of his commercial blotted-line technique, Warhol 
adopted the mechanical processes of reproduction to reject the constraints of the 
individualistic Abstract Expressionist style.   Moreover, as his works of art became 
increasingly mechanized, Warhol began to brashly serialize appropriated images of the 
American cultural landscape.  Through the mechanical silk-screen process and the use of 
copied photographic images, Warhol pithily counterfeited both the subject and art of “low” 
consumer culture.188   
In 1962, Warhol created his first serial works by using a mechanical silk-screen 
technique.  Although Warhol considered his 32 Soup Can paintings to be a series, according 
to The Andy Warhol Catalogue Raisonné Volume One, his 200 Campbellʼs Soup Cans, 100 
Cans (Fig. 17), 100 Campbellʼs Soup Cans, and Campbellʼs Soup Box were the first works 
to “consolidate the principle of repetition within single works.”189  It has been hypothesized 
that Warholʼs Campbell soup can and money paintings were conceived at the same time.  
According to Warholʼs friend and assistant Ted Carey, it was gallerist Murriel Latow who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comic book imagery he exclaimed, “I saw Andy's work at Leo Castelli's about the same time I brought mine in, 
about the spring of 1961... Of course, I was amazed to see Andy's work because he was doing cartoons of 
Nancy and Dick Tracy and they were similar to mine.” Gary Comenas “The Origins of Andy Warholʼs Soup Cans 
or The Synthesis of Nothingness” (London 2003, revised 2010), warholstars.org, 
http://www.warholstars.org/art/warhol/soup.html (accessed February 13, 2012). 
187 Francis, Pop, 85. Superman is based on a panel from Supermanʼs Girl Friend, Lois Lane (24, DC/National 
Comics, April 1961).  
188 Andrew Wilson, “This is Not By Me,” in Dear Image: Art, Copyright and Culture, edited by Daniel McClean and 
Karsten Schubert (London: Ridinghouse, 2002), 377. 
189 According to Irving Blum, director of the Ferus Gallery, Warholʼs 32 Campbellʼs Soup Can paintings, exhibited 
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as a series.” Patrick S. Smith, Andy Warholʼs Art and Films (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1986), 220. 
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Phaidon), 88.   
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came up with the idea for both subjects:  
[T]his particular day, after going to the Oldenburg Store, I called him [Warhol] when I got home, 
and I said 'John, Muriel, and I are having dinner tonight. Do you want to have dinner with us?' 
And he said, 'No, I'm just too depressed'... so, after dinner we went to Andy's, and he was very 
depressed. And Muriel was depressed because she was either at this time declaring 
bankruptcy or was about to declare bankruptcy... And so Andy said, 'I've got to do something.' 
He said, 'The cartoon paintings... it's too late. I've got to do something that really will have a lot 
of impact, that will be different enough from Lichtenstein and Rosenquist, that will be very 
personal, that won't look like I'm doing exactly what they're doing.' And he said, 'I don't know 
what to do.' 'So,' he said, 'Muriel, you've got fabulous ideas. Can't you give me an idea?' And, 
so, Muriel said, 'Yes.' 'But,' she said, 'it's going to cost you money.' So Andy said, 'How much?' 
So she said, 'Fifty dollars.' She said, 'Get your cheque book and write me a cheque for fifty 
dollars.' And Andy ran and got his cheque book, like, you know, he was really crazy and he 
wrote out the cheque. He said, 'All right, Give me a fabulous idea.' And so Muriel said, What do 
you like more than anything else in the world?' So Andy said, 'I don't know. What?' So she 
said, 'Money' ... And so Andy said, 'Oh, that's wonderful.' So then either that, or, she said, 
'you've got to find something that's recognizable to almost everybody. Something you see 
everyday that everybody would recognize. Something like a can of Campbell's Soup (emphasis 
added).190 
 
Regardless of the origins of either subject matter, it appears that Warholʼs embrace of 
repeated images of mundane consumer objects coincides with his literal printing of paper 
money. 
 Warholʼs artistic production of the early 1960s thus illustrated his obsession with 
Americaʼs consumer capitalism, and his mechanized technique illustrated the desires and 
fears of Americaʼs consumerist culture.191  In 1962, the same year as the Campbellʼs Soup 
series, Warhol began using the mechanical silk-screen printing process, which he first 
employed for a group of money paintings (Fig. 17).  As the works depict images of printed 
one and two-dollar bills, Warhol systematically matched the subject to its duplicative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Patrick S. Smith, Warhol: Conversations about the Artist (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1988), 90-91. 
There is a scholarly debate about Warholʼs money paintings origins, as the credibility of Careyʼs statement (the 
soup canʼs seem like an afterthought) is questionable.  In another account printed in The Andy Warhol Catalogue 
Raisonné, according to gallerist Eleanor Ward and Emile de Antonio, Ward promised Warhol a one-person 
exhibition in the Stable Gallery if he would paint her a lucky two-dollar bill.  See Patrick Smith, Andy Warholʼs Art 
and Films: Studies in the Fine Arts Avant-Garde (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1986), 512, and Victor 
Bockris, The Life and Death of Andy Warhol (New York, Bantam Books, 1989), 111.    
191 Thierry de Duve, “Andy Warhol, or The Machine Perfected,” translated by Rosalind Krauss, October 48 
(Spring, 1989), 3. Commodities are both artifacts (manmade products), and goods (wares possessed by a man). 
As artifacts they are the “fruit of someoneʼs labor,” as goods they allow someone (else) the enjoyment of this 
materialized labor. Under these two aspects wares possess use-value (the use of the labor-power spent for their 
production; the use of this same labor-power in their consumption. But it is the entry of artifacts and goods into 
the circuit of exchange that makes commodities of them. Anything whatever becomes a commodity once the use 
of the labor power invested in it is postponed in order that it be traded against another thing into which an equal 
amount of labor-power has been invested, money serving as general means of equivalency. Ibid, 6-7. 
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technique, and disconnected it by way of the artistic impulse.192  Furthermore, Warholʼs 
money paintings blatantly link his works of art to the realm of commodities, and displays, 
literally and figuratively, “money on walls.”193  As Warhol impishly declared, “I like money on 
the wall. Say you were going to buy a $200,000 painting. I think you should take that money, 
tie it up, and hang it on the wall. Then when someone visited you the first thing they would 
see is the money on the wall.”194  The “money on the wall,” however, is superficial—merely 
image—and Warholʼs hand-drawn silk-screened facsimiles demonstrate the “devaluation [of 
the image] through counterfeiting.”195  The money silkscreens thus exemplify the instabilities 
of cultural, aesthetic and legal value in images. 
 Warhol first created his dollar-bill paintings using hand-cut stamps (Fig. 19), but he quickly 
realized they could not accurately replicate the complex design of Americaʼs paper money and he 
approached Tiber Press about making printing screens.196  However, Tiber Press informed Warhol 
that he could not use photographs of “real money” as it would run afoul of anti-counterfeit 
legislation.197  To controvert these limitations he created hand-drawn facsimiles.  Similar to the 
nineteenth-century trompe lʼoeil painters, namely William Harnett, Warhol was forewarned that his 
money images would run afoul of the United Stateʼs counterfeit statutes, and ultimately the law 
dictated Warholʼs involvement—the application of his hand—in the final work. 
 
Counterfeit and Copyright: The Protection of Fiscal and Cultural Capital  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Livingstone, Pop Art, 159. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Andy Warhol, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A to B and Back Again), (New York and London: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 133-34.  
195 Foster, The First Age of Pop, 132-33. 
196 According to printer Floriano Vecchi, Warhol had frequented Tiber Press since the mid-fifties, selling him 
drawings to print on greeting cards.  He continues to state that Warhol had observed him working on silkscreen 
prints, and that “[h]e was totally aware of [the] silkscreen [process],” although he originally showed no interest in.  
Vecchi assumed like most artists of the day, Warhol also distained the printing process.  Tony Scherman and 
David Dalton, POP: The Genius of Andy Warhol (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2009), 103-105.  
197 Gary Comenas, “The Origin of Andy Warholʼs Soup Cans or The Synthesis of Nothingness” (London, 2003), 
Warholstars.org, http://www.warholstars.org/art/warhol/soup.html (February 13, 2012). 
	   	   62	  
	  
 The word “counterfeit” historically described forged money or documents, however, the term 
inevitably expanded as technology advanced.  Consequently, “counterfeiting” became associated 
with the devaluation of intellectual property, and its definition expanded to include “any 
manufacturing of a product [that] so closely imitates the appearance of the product of another to 
mislead a consumer that it is the product of another (emphasis added).”198  Reliability is critical to 
the value of money, and as technology progressed, credibility became increasingly important to the 
value of cultural objects.  By vesting control in the author, copyright performs many of the same 
functions as Americaʼs counterfeit statute.  However, while counterfeit legislation primarily protects 
the value of currency, copyright legislation can be viewed to protect the economic value of creative 
production. 
As discussed in chapter one, money has signified a nationʼs “social, political and cultural 
values like credibility, political unity and ʻnationalʼ identity;” however, in post World War Two 
America, the mass-produced consumer good was again elevated to this esteemed position.199   
Consequently, just as counterfeit and copyright statutes were rapidly enacted (and amended) during 
the nineteenth-century, they were also expanded throughout the twentieth-century to protect the 
commercial (exchange) value of commodity goods, including works of art.  Warholʼs serial imagery 
can be seen to mischievously prod at the historical distrust in mass-produced art making, and his 
repetitious replicas of commodity objects pointedly toy with both aesthetic and legal institutions.  
Critical interpretations of Warholʼs oeuvre commonly read the artistʼs work, including its serial 
structure, in terms of the cultural and political environment in which it was created. In the majority of 
these interpretations, the repetitive structure of Warholʼs images obtains its meaning in relation to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198“The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting is a Global Problem affecting a Wide Range of Industries,” p. 2, 
http://www.intellectualpropertynow.com/files/Economic_Impact_of_Counterfeiting.pdf (accessed February 12, 
2012). 
199 Arjo Klamer and Harry van Dalen, “The Double-Sidedness of Money,” Etnofoor 13, no. 2, MONEY (2000), p. 
97.  
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iconology.200  I argue, that in addition to these discussions, it is also pertinent to interpret the 
repetitive structure of Warholʼs images in relation to the nature of the materials he appropriated and 
social and legal codes that he chose to violate.  I believe a legal reading of Warholʼs work will reveal 
important facets of his creative process and provide a means to integrate his often-neglected late 
work into the totality of his fine art oeuvre.201       
With the advent of Pop art, works of art increasingly became the subject of lawsuits, and 
artists were frequently cited with copyright infringement:  Robert Rauschenberg, Roy Lichtenstein, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 Jennifer Dyer, “The Metaphysics of the Mundane: Understanding Andy Warholʼs Serial Imagery,” Artibus et 
Historiae 25, no. 49 (2004), p. 34-35.  Throughout the course of the article, Dyer provides a cohesive 
historiography of scholarship on Warholʼs serial imagery. A summary of this scholasticism is included below:   
Arthur Danto: Warholʼs work “remains political” because it embodies “the American soul, mis a nu,” and 
thus Warhol should be read as a “symptom of his media-oriented culture at a unique historical moment.” Ibid, 34. 
Simon Watney: Warholʼs creative activity needs to be analyzed in terms of “Warholʼs construction of the 
persona ʻWarhol.ʼ” He argues that Warhol is important because he represents a new type of artist and type of 
artistic production, that forces viewer to reconfigure the division between art and life: the “Warhol effect.”  
Accordingly, according to Watney, Warholʼs relation to his life explains his relation to his art. Ibid. 
Benjamin Buchloch and Rainer Crone: they both argue that there is a “developmental consistency to 
Warholʼs practice which shows him to be a serious originator of novel aesthetic objects.”  His work and practice 
thus must be read in terms of the works that preceded him.  Accordingly, Warhol does not deviate from the 
model of the “heroic originator,” but instead develops the trope by presenting himself as a unique author/creator. 
In this role, he “politically and culturally problematizes traditional conceptions of the significance of iconography” 
by repeatedly presenting contemporary icons as to render them meaningless. Warholʼs artworks are therefore 
interpreted with reference to his persona, and this relationship informs the viewer how to interpret his art. Ibid. 
Hal Foster: distinguishes three types of critical analysis. First, the “simulacral view” (similar to Buchloch 
and Crone), in which icons are treated as arbitrary and meaningless because they reflect “apathetic 
commercialism and commodity fetishism (in both content and structure).” Second, the “referential view,” which 
citing Thomas Crow, claims the themes of Warholʼs serial imagery reveals something tragic and real about 
culture. Warhol thus specifically selected imagery to affect/startle the viewer, and the repetition of the image 
forced the viewer to consider hotly contested subjects such as the death penalty, racism and late modern 
capitalism.  Third, “traumatic realism,” whereby traumatic iconology of car crashes, criminals and death is directly 
linked to the repetitive structures Warhol employed. This juxtaposition simultaneously distances viewers from the 
traumatic affect of the icon, while forcing them to be affected. According to Foster, “multiplicity makes for the 
paradox not only of images that are body affective and affectless, but of viewers that are neither integrated . . . 
nor dissolved.” Ibid, 34-35. 
Jennifer Dyer: asserts that Warholʼs serial images present the structure of the mundane as a “dynamic 
structure of serial actualization, and that everything in the mundane world, including Warhol himself, is taken to 
be an instance of the structure.” Therefore, his serial imagery is meaningful because it reveals of the significance 
of the banal, which includes the features of everyday life and the world. She argues that his oeuvre should be 
considered ironic, as it reveals “the activity of making things the same also makes them different.” Ibid, 35-36.  
201 According to David James, generally speaking, the “good Warhol” is thought to be the artist operating 
between 1961-1968. The art of this period is distinguished from his late works, as “some painterly or 
compositional strategy is proposed as the signal of the worksʼ difference from the newspaper, advertising, or 
publicity photographs from which their imagery derives.” Moreover, the “good” Warholʼs are thought to “operat[e] 
a self-conscious denaturing of th[e] icons that make them, on some level, critical of late capitalism.”  James goes 
on to disavow this assumption, and I continue to assert that by analyzing Warholʼs oeuvre through a legal lens, 
his late works can be viewed as even more “critical,” and as important as his Pop art, as they critique the legal 
system directly governing their production: copyright. David E. James, “The Unsecret Life: A Warhol 
Advertisement,” October 56 High/Low: Art and Mass Culture (Spring, 1991), 26-27.    
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and Andy Warhol were all accused of copyright infringement, by individual copyright holders, in the 
1960s.  As previously discussed, the 1909 Act expanded and enhanced the individual monopolies 
granted to copyright holders.  In combination with the progressively expanding legal definition of 
“works of art” (Bleistein and Mazer), and the increased duration of copyright protection, copyright 
legislation can be seen to judicially privatizing creative expression in order to protect (elevate) its 
commercial and tradable value.202   
Between the years of 1962 and 1964, however, Warhol produced an astonishing number of 
artworks, almost 2000.  Creating more than one work a day, the sheer proliferation of his oeuvre 
threatened to flood the art markets and devalue the “fine” art designation as a whole.203  When read 
in connection with his excessive artistic production, the use of mundane iconography, the gradual 
removal of the artistʼs hand, and eventual appropriation of published and copyrighted photographic 
works, I believe that Warholʼs serial imagery can be interpreted as a personal attack on American 
copyright law.  As a highly successful commercial illustrator, it is likely that Warhol was familiar with 
the general working concepts of copyright law.  When doing business with large-scale corporations 
like I. Miller and Bonwit Teller (whether he was hired as an employee or remained an independent 
contractor), Warhol was more than likely exposed to contractual clauses regarding licensing and/or 
copyright ownership and/or assignment.  Consequently, it seems unlikely—despite his childish and 
naïve persona—that Warhol would have been unaware of the legal implications of appropriating 
(without permission) published works of art.  
 Almost fifteen years after printing their article on Jackson Pollock, Life Magazine cynically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Both Bleistein v. Donaldson and Mazer v. Stein increased the potential scope of federal copyright protection: 
as discussed in Chapter One, Bleistein broadened copyright to include commercial advertisements, and as 
discussed in Chapter Three, Mazer expanded copyright to include a utilitarian lamp base.  In addition to this 
expanded scope of protection, the 1909 Act expanded the duration of copyright from a potential forty-two year 
period to a potential fifty-six years (twenty-eight years with a twenty-eight year renewal option).  Therefore, 
individuals could claim copyright ownership to a wider degree of objects, and maintain that protection for a longer 
period of time. See the Copyright Act of 1909. U.S. Statutes at large 60-349 (1909), 
http://www.megalaw.com/top/copyright/1909/1909ch1.php (accessed November 21, 2011). 
203 Foster, The First Pop Age, p. 133. 
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revisited the subject of fine art.  Whereas the 1949 article subtly advertised Pollock as the 
“[g]reatest living painter,” in 1964, it charged Roy Lichtenstein, and Pop art, with the denigration of 
fine art in America.  The article entitled, “Is He the Worst Artist in the U.S.,” critiqued Lichtensteinʼs 
work as depicting “tedious copies of the banal,” and in contrast to the earlier article on Pollock, the 
reproduced artwork was virtually indiscernible from the surrounding commercial advertisements.  In 
response to the question, “[d]oes Lichtenstein transform his source material or does he merely copy 
it,” Lichtenstein suggestively retorted, “[t]he closer my work is to the original, the more threatening . . 
. the content.”204 
 The threat that Lichtenstein identifies—the distinction between the original and the copy—is 
at the heart of the fear of the counterfeit, or its twentieth-century manifestation, the copy or multiple.  
As consumerism progressed, and as mass-produced objects became increasingly identified with 
American culture, the severance of fine art from commercial imagery served to distinguish the 
reproducible commodity from an invaluable original creation.  As the 1909 Act was interpreted to 
vest the author with an exclusive right to copy, Warholʼs serial imagery not only illustrates the 
banality of American culture, but also visually mitigates the constraints of copyright law.  In a 1963 
interview with Gene Swanson, Warhol famously proclaimed, “I think somebody should be able to do 
all my paintings for me,” and “I think it would be so great if more people took up silk screens so that 
no one would know whether my picture was mine or someone elseʼs.”205  While this statement is 
typically read in terms of Warholʼs duplicative machine aesthetic, it can also be interpreted as a 
direct assault on the governing 1909 Act.  By confusing the act of creation, Warholʼs mass-
produced artworks castrated the principles of intellectual property, and I argue that the Flowers 
series demonstrates that this assault was more conceived than happenstance.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Dorothy Seiberling, “Is He the Worst Artist in the U.S.?,” Life (January 31, 1964), 79-82. 
205 Andy Warhol, as quoted in “What is Pop?” in Art in Theory: 1900-2000, An Anthology of Changing Ideas, 
Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, eds. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003)  
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 For his first show at the prominent Leo Castelli Gallery, Warhol displayed just one image, a 
grouping of four hibiscus flowers, photo silkscreened in numerous color configurations (Fig. 21).  
Warholʼs friend Henry Geldzahler, curator and art critic, is quoted to take credit for the idea of the 
series:  “[I] looked around the studio and it was all Marilyn and disasters and death.  I said, Andy, 
maybe itʼs enough death now.ʼ He said, ʻWhat do you mean?ʼ I said, ʻWell, how about this?ʼ I 
opened a magazine to four flowers.”206  The magazine that Geldzahler alleged to have opened was 
the June 1964 issue of Modern Photography, and the photograph was part of a two-page spread 
shot by the publicationʼs executive editor, Patricia Caulfield (Fig. 22).  Warhol cropped the photo, 
cutting out three of the seven flowers, and ran the photo multiple times through the Photostat 
machine to flatten the image.  According to assistant Billy Linich, “[h]e didnʼt want [the painting] to 
look like a photo at all.  He just wanted the shape, the basic outline of the flowers.”207 
 Although Warhol intended to transform the source photograph, he did not secure permission 
from its original author, Caulfield, to make the reproductions.  In 1965, Caulfield discovered the use 
of her photo when she came upon a poster of Warholʼs Flowers in a New York bookstore, and 
“struck by itʼs familiarity, she bought one, compared it to a picture she had taken, and called her 
lawyer.”208  Advocating his client to the press, Caulfieldʼs lawyer stated that if she won the case, she 
would have the right to “impound, and even destroy, every Flowers painting sold;” inciting Warholʼs 
facetiously response “wouldnʼt that be marvelous!”209 
 This reaction, when read in relation to the previously mentioned Swanson interview, 
illustrates the conscious subversion of Warholʼs Flowers series.  In a letter describing the terms of 
Warhol and Caulfieldʼs settlement, Jerald Ordover, representation for Warhol and Castelli in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Henry Geldzahler, as cited in Scherman and Dalton, POP: The Genius of Andy Warhol, 235. 
207 Billy Linich, as cited in Scherman and Dalton, Pop, 236. 
208 Ibid, 237. 
209 Ibid, 237-8.  According to Jerald Ordover, Warhol and Leo Castelliʼs negotiator in their settlement proceedings 
with Patricia Caulifield, claim letters were also sent Poster Originals Ltd., who had produced the poster she saw 
in the bookstore window, and to the Museum of Modern Art, which had reproduced Warholʼs painting on a 
greeting card.  John Carlin, “Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law,” Columbia 
Journal of Law and Arts 13 (1988-1989), 128.  
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negotiations, revealed that Warhol had spoke to Caulfield before creating the series.  According to 
Ordover, Warhol contacted Caulfield, in her position as Executive Editor of Modern Photography, to 
request a print or transparency of the published photograph, and she promised to send one without 
mentioning that she was the author of the work or requesting a licensing fee.210  The fact that 
Warhol recognized the need to request permission to use the photo evidences his awareness of 
copyright restrictions, and I assert demonstrates that he consciously created artwork that ran afoul 
of copyright law.211  Despite his carefully crafted naïf persona, according to Ivan Karp “[Warhol] was 
very innocent of doing a disservice to this photographer[,]” I argue that he reproduced and 
published copyright works as a reaction against the oppressively expanded scope of federal 
copyright protection.212 
 In this critique of twentieth-century copyright law Warhol specifically equates his fine art 
paintings to mundane commodity goods, and when negotiating to resolve his multiple lawsuits he 
specifically used his commandeered artworks as exchangeable tender:  to function as money.  
According to the previously mentioned letter written by Jerald Ordover, “While Alan [, the trial 
counsel retained to represent Castelli and Warhol,] was explaining the intricacies of the copyright 
law as it applied to the case, Andy suddenly spoke up and asked whether he couldnʼt satisfy the 
claim by giving Caulfield a painting,” and excited by the proposition, “Alan and I proceeded to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Jerald Ordover, as cited in Carlin, “Culture Vultures,” 128. 
211 This assertion is additionally bolstered by Warholʼs interaction with James Harvey, the Abstract Expressionist 
artist who, in 1961, designed the Brillo box that Warhol famously appropriated.  According to Louis Menard, critic 
for The New Yorker, after attending Warholʼs 1964 show at the Stable Gallery, Harvey was “stunned to see his 
design replicated, and, later his dealer protested.” Louis Menand, “Top of the Pops: Did Andy Warhol change 
everything?,” The New Yorker, January 11, 2010, 60.  However, while Menard conveys that Warhol offered 
Harvey one of his Brillo Box sculptures to compensate for his copyright infringement, and that he also suggested 
that Harvey give him an autographed box in return; art historian Martha Buskirk denotes that Irving Sandler, a 
New York City art critic, “[s]uggested to Harvey that he should counter Warholʼs show by signing the actual boxes 
himself,” and that “Warhol found out about [the signing] and called Harvey and offered to trade.”  Irving Sandler, 
as cited in Martha Buskirk, The Contingent Object of Contemporary Art (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 
2003), 80-1.  Despite the validity of either account, the conflict provides further evidence that Warhol was aware 
of copyright law and consciously chose to push the boundaries of its restrictions.      
212 Ivan Karp, as cited in Buskirk, The Contingent Object, 85.  Ivan Karp, co-director at the Leo Castelli Gallery, 
continued to state that Warhol was not doing Caulfield a “disserve” because “this photograph was not what you 
might call a ʻremarkable photograph.ʼ It was not an earth shaking photograph, but Warhol made a remarkable 
series of paintings out of it . . . they were totally successful, and we sold them all!” Ibid. 
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negotiate a settlement that was based on Andy giving her two Flowers paintings or $6000.”  The 
irony would not have been lost on Warhol, as he offered to pay Caulfield with the exact implement 
of his transgression.  Moreover, Warhol specifically made and sold four new Flowers paintings to 
pay off the claim and its legal fees (Fig. 23), “[w]ith some left over for Leo and Andy.”  By reprinting 
copies of the infringing artwork, with the express intent that they equate the abstracted value of 
money, he cleverly conflated the tenets of copyright and counterfeit laws.213       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Jerald Ordover, as cited in Carlin, “Culture Vultures,” 128-9.  While Caulfield originally opted to take the 
money, the $6000, the settlement also provided that she get a share of any “future exploitation of the image,” and 
when Warhol decided to make a subsequent print edition of Flowers, “[Ordover] had to negotiate a further 
payment.  This time, they wisely took their payment in prints.” Ibid.  
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Chapter Four: Individualized Copyright Legislation and an Indexical Warhol: An Artistʼs 
Legal Critique 
 
Abstraction is a Type of Decadence. 
An Elite is Inevitable. 
Categorizing Fear is Calming. 
Government is a Burden on the People. 
Knowledge Should be Advanced at All Costs. 
Money Creates Taste. 
Private Property Created Crime.214 
 
American copyright legislation underwent a significant revision in the late twentieth-
century, resulting in the presently governing Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter “the 1976 
Act”).  While the statutory changes represent practical considerations, such as rapidly 
developing technology and the desire to join the Berne Union, by formally codifying the cult 
of the original, it also tangibly locates Americaʼs egocentric fear of the multiple.215  Barbara 
Ringer, Register of Copyrights, and an important player in the revision process stated: “[T]he 
new  statute makes a number of fundamental changes in the American copyright system, 
including some so profound that they may mark a shift in direction for the very philosophy of 
copyright itself.”216  However, none of the thirty-four separate studies prepared under the 
Copyright Office to provide background information for Congress focused on the philosophy 
(or history) of copyright, and consequently, the centuries-old debate concerning the 
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fundamental nature of copyright—whether it is a natural-law property right or a statutory 
grant of a limited monopoly—remained unresolved.217    
Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries copyright has become a hotly 
contested topic, and it is an issue that is felt by every facet of the art world:  artists, gallery 
owners, curators and museum staff.218  Significantly, it is well documented that the 1976 Act 
was principally promoted by private sector lobbying demands, such as Disney Corporation, 
resulting in the drafting of narrow legislation by private sector stakeholders in favor of their 
own interests.  It is argued that the resultant legal doctrine privileges the private (corporate) 
interests of authors and owners, while negating the publicʼs interest in, and use of, 
copyrighted material.219  According to Jessica D. Litman, noted copyright expert, “One can 
choose a statutory provision almost at random; a review of the provisionʼs legislative history 
will show that credit for its substance belongs more to the representatives of interested 
parties negotiating among themselves then to the member of Congress who sponsored, 
reported or debated the bill.”220   Tellingly, in the late 1980s, Disney sued a Florida day-care 
center for their unsolicited use of Mickey, Minnie, Donald and Goofy on the external walls of 
their playground.221  According one of Disneyʼs intellectual property lawyers, “a nursery 
school is no less a profit-making enterprise just because little children are involved.”222  As 
such, the text of the 1976 Act blatantly fuses the art world/market to the economic and legal 
realms, and it provides an intriguing lens through which to view the artistic production of the 
day.   	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218 Daniel McClean, “Introduction,” in Dear Image: Art, Copyright and Culture, Daniel McClean and Karsten 
Schubert, eds. (London: Ridinghouse, 2002), 11. 
219 Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Pubishers, 2006), 145.   
220 Jessica D. Litman, “Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History” Cornell Law Review 72 (1987), 870. 221	  Gail Diane Cox, “Donʼt Mess with the Mouse” The National Law Journal (July 31, 1989), 1, as cited in 
Buskirk, “Commodification as Censor,” 82.  Moreover, when approached by phone in November 1991, a Disney 
representative refused to comment on the matter, stating that it was a “closed issue.” Ibid.	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In the critically controversial late artwork of Andy Warhol (1980s), the intricate 
relationship between money, copyright jurisprudence, and artistic production is manifest, as 
is the increasingly codependent relationship between art, law, and cultural identification.  
Analyzing the constantly evolving text of American copyright statute not only reveals the 
subtle nuance implicit in these complex relationships, but also characterizes and affirms the 
notorious “business art” of the 1980s and 90s.  In this chapter I will demonstrate how the 
aforementioned artwork is more than a product of the big business zeitgeist of the go-go 
eighties and nineties.  As Warholʼs late work chronologically illustrates not only the inherent 
insufficiency of copyright jurisprudence (the confused divergence between natural property 
rights and statutorily granted limited monopolies), but also how the legal world interprets and 
consequently attempts to establish—through the codification of modernismʼs perpetuating 
antagonisms:  “unique/reproduced,” “original/copy,” “high culture/mass culture”—the nationʼs 
cultural identity.223      
The 1976 Act was the product of twenty years of “scholarship, analysis, 
documentation, negotiation, lobbying, drafting, re-drafting and talk.”224  Notably, the drafting 
period of the statute directly correlates with the development of the American Pop 
movement.  It does not, however, adopt the egalitarian message of Pop artʼs cultural 
critique, but instead statutorily reasserts the importance of the “original,” a principle tenant of 
Abstract Expressionism.  It is thus arguable that the 1976 Act is inherently backwatered in 
both its scope of protection, and as case law suggests, its application.   
While the application of an arguably antiquated copyright statute has a chilling effect 
upon artistic production, an opinion well documented in legal scholarship, I will argue that 
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the constricting word of law simultaneously stimulated a rebellious (pirating) creative 
response.  As such, Warholʼs “business art” not only represents a satirical critique of 
contemporary consumer culture, it also serves to negate the confining pillars of copyright 
jurisprudence through its brazen creation of the counterfeit (the high art knock-off), and 
purposefully marks the contentious divide between the art world/market and the omnipresent 
legal institution.  According to Daniel McClean, “[f]or many artists and curators, the ʻintrusionʼ 
of law into the hallowed sphere of artistic production is perceived to be, at the least, nothing 
short of perverse and, more ominously, to set a precedent for state restrictions on artistic 
freedom and individual creativity.”225   
 
The Copyright Act of 1976  
  The 1976 Act substantially expanded the scope of federal copyright protection 
offered under the 1909 Act, whereby “[t]he ʻscopeʼ of a copyright is the range of rights 
granted by law.”226  While the scope of the 1790 Act was very narrow, covering only “maps, 
charts, and books,” and granting the author the exclusive right to “publish” copyrighted 
works, the 1976 Act covers practically any creative work (as long as it is reducible to a 
tangible form), gives the author the exclusive right of control over “copies” of that work, and 
expands the authorʼs control over copyrighted works to include any “derivative work.”227  As 
the scope of federal copyright protection expanded, the word of law became manifest in the 
artistic production of the day, visually and textually illustrating economist Ernest Mandelʼs 
observation of late capitalism: “Mechanization, standardization, over-specialization and 	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227 In addition, as the scope of copyright protection expanded, procedural limitations on the right simultaneously 
relaxed.  The 1976 Act did way with the 1909 Actʼs requirements of renewal (in 1992 Congress abandoned the 
renewal requirement for all works created before 1978, and all works still under copyright were accorded the 
maximum term then available), registration and notice.  Consequently, copyright is now automatic, and it exists 
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parcellization of labour, which in the past determined only the realm of commodity 
production in actual industry, now penetrates into all sectors of social life.”228  
The specific text of the 1976 Act provides unique insight into Warholʼs late work, 
which has been commonly denounced as “capitulations to money.”229  Analyzing the 
semantics of the evolving copyright statute illustrates how the “avid collecting of [duplicative] 
works raises the further issue of how art that incorporates a questioning of originality, 
uniqueness, artistic skill, tough, longevity, or even materiality can and has been enfolded 
into a system of collecting and valuation founded on those very qualities.”230  I believe that 
connecting the evolving text of the 1976 Act to Warholʼs works of art produced after its 
enactment, will illustrates the “parallels between such artworld conventions as the limited 
edition and broader efforts to limit the proliferation and thereby insure the value of inherently 
reproducible forms through legal controls.”231  Furthermore, this comparison will localize an 
instance where broader cultural changes have specifically influenced how the artworld 
values the reproductive image, and in turn, facilitates the formation of Americaʼs collective 
(and consumptive) identity. 
Under the 1909 Act copyright was more regulatory than proprietary, and it was 
premised upon the publication of a work with proper copyright notice and registration (if a 
work was published without proper notice, ©, it immediately fell into the public domain).232  In 
contrast, under the 1976 Act copyright is divested of such formalities, and federal protection 
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arises automatically upon the creation of a work:  section 102(a) grants copyright protection 
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or 
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of machine or device (emphasis added).”233  Intellectual 
property scholars W. Ron Gard and Elizabeth Townsend Gard assert that, “[l]ike property 
law generally, copyright addresses the social relationships among people in regard to 
things,” and that “[t]he moment designated by copyright law as the start of protection, then, 
tells us at what point the law understands a workʼs mediating role in social relations to 
begin.”234  As such, the 1909 Act maintained that “[a] workʼs propertizable role in social 
relations [began] with its public dissemination in the marketplace,” while the 1976 Act made 
the “moment” of the workʼs “inception” a protectable value in the nationʼs social relations.235 
The legislative history of the 1976 Act illustrates the careful, and often convoluted, 
drafting of Section 102.  While the subject matter of copyright under the 1909 Act included 
“[a]ll the writings of an author,” in an early draft of the statute (Report of Register of 
Copyright on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (Tentative draft), 1961), it was 
recommended that “[t]he statute should mention the general requirements that any work, in 
order to be copyrightable, must be fixed in some tangible form and must represent the 
product of original creative authorship.”236  The aforesaid text remained a legislative 
suggestion until it was incorporated into the language of the 1963 Preliminary Draft 
(Preliminary Draft for a Revised U.S. Copyright Law, Part 3): “Copyright protection under this 
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title shall be available for an original work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which it can be visually or aurally 
perceived, reproduced, performed, or represented either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device.”237  Section 102 did not reach its current diction until the 1966 House Judiciary 
Committee Report on October 12, 1966.   
As previously stated, according to copyright scholar and lawyer Peter Jaszi, “[t]he 
general notion that law is derivative of cultural attitudes is not revolutionary in itself,” 
however, he goes on to state that “[a]mong intellectual property scholars, there has been 
some resistance to claims of cultural influence in the copyright field—at least in the United 
States.”238  He attributes this resistance to a “[c]ollective, proudly, disillusioned position that 
copyright, unlike other bodies of law, is really all about the money,” and the belief that 
“[intellectual property] law is simply a machine to generate innovation through economic 
incentives[.]”239  This statement, written by a prominent member of the legal profession, 
illustrates the vast theoretical gap between the legal and art worlds, a gap famously noted 
by Justice Holmes in the early twentieth-century (see Chapter Two) and adapted by Jaszi in 
the twenty-first century, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for one trained only in the law 
to venture a definition of a term as protean as postmodernism[.]”240          
Despite the aforementioned proclamations, the influence of culture upon copyright 
becomes manifest by relating the drafting process of the 1976 Act to the reactionary artworld 
of the 1960s and 70s.  As previously noted in Chapters One and Two, nineteenth-century 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Ibid, 21-22.  The relevant statute of the 1909 Act states: § 4. All Writings of Author Included.—The works for 
which copyright may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of the author, Ibid, 1. 
238 Peter Jaszi, “Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?” in Making and Unmaking Intellectual 
Property: Creative Production in Legal and Cultural Perspective, Mario Biagioli, Peter Jaszi, and Martha 
Woodmansee, eds. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 415. 
239 Ibid, 415-16. 
240 Ibid, 413. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated in the Supreme Court opinion for Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Company, “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
	   	   76	  
	  
copyright statute maintained the contemporary elitist notion of “fine art,” which gave way in 
the early twentieth-century to the more egalitarian “works of art.”  The development of 
copyright terminology reflects—as evidenced by the perseverance of money painting and 
the nationʼs shifting centers of wealth—the intricate connection between economics and art, 
and consequently, art and the law.  Interestingly, the 1976 Act is devoid of the fungible term, 
“art,” and instead pragmatically enumerates three separate aesthetic designations:  
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”241  If, as W. Ron Gard and Elizabeth Townsend 
Gard suppose, “[t]he moment designated by copyright law as the start of protection [tells] us 
at what point the law understands a workʼs mediating role in social relations to begin;” than 
the Congressionally delineated “works of authorship” signifies how the law interprets both 
the cultural and economic value of artistic production.242   
 The Register Report (Tentative Draft) of 1961 stipulates “[w]orks of ʻapplied artʼ” are 
to be copyrightable, and recommends that “[t]he copyright statute [make] clear that for 
purposes of registration, the “works of art” category is confined to pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works that are non-utilitarian in themselves, even though they may portray or be 
intended for use in useful articles (emphasis added).”243  Two years later, in the Preliminary 
Draft of 1963, the drafters of the copyright revision removed the “works of ʻapplied artsʼ” 
category and replaced it with “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”  However, it also 
stipulated that this grouping “includ[e] two-dimensional and three-dimension works of fine, 
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and reproductions, maps globes, charts, plans, 
diagrams, and models, and works used in advertising or in labels for merchandise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Ibid. 
242 W. Ron Gard and Elizabeth Townsend Gard, “Marked by Modernism,” 161; Ibid. 
243 Alan Latman and James F. Lightstone, The Kaminstein Legislative History Project, 5. 
	   	   77	  
	  
(emphasis added).”244  The descriptive text was not deleted until the House Judiciary 
Committee Report of 1966, indicating both the legal and art worlds vacillating definitions of 
Art, and illustrating how the 1976 Act was not only informed by contemporary aesthetic 
issue, namely the debate between Abstract Expressionism and Pop, but also how its 
arguments instigated a subversive “business” aesthetic.    
According to artist and art historian Eva Cockcroft, “[a]fter the Industrial Revolution, . 
. . with the development of the gallery system, and the rise of museums, the role of artists 
became less clearly defined, and the objects artists fashioned increasingly became part of a 
general flow of commodities in a market economy.”245  Primarily developed as private 
institution, stemming from wealthy individualʼs personal collections, the American museum 
was (and continues to be) commonly founded and supported by corporate sponsorship and 
managed by a Board of Trustees with broad political and financial affluence.  For example, 
at the behest of the Museum of Modern Art, mainly founded through the efforts of Mrs. John 
D. Rockefeller, Jr., Abstract Expressionism became intimately related to American politics.  
Cultural projects collaboratively implemented by the CIA and MOMA (which were similar in 
fact and mutually supportive) “provide[d] the well-funded and more persuasive arguments 
and exhibitions needed to sell the rest of the world on the benefits of life and art under 
[American] capitalism.”246       
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Interestingly, the drafting period of the 1976 Act correlates with the gradual decline of 
Abstract Expressionism and the radical development of Pop art.  Yet, the text of the 1976 
Act specifically utilizes the ideology of Abstract Expressionism to formulate a privatized—
corporately minded—system of federal copyright protection. Porter A. McCray, director of 
MOMAʼs international activities throughout the 1950s, served as one of the Rockefellersʼ 
principle agents in the “export of American culture to areas considered vital to Rockefeller 
interests.”247  While Cray provided exhibitions primarily consisting of Abstract Expressionist 
works to accommodate the museumʼs quasi-corporate function, the United Statesʼ State 
Department sponsored various speaking tours by prominent critic, and Abstract 
Expressionist enthusiast, Clement Greenberg to Europe and Asia to promote American 
culture, thereby fulfilling an outright government function.248  Furthermore, Abstract 
Expressionism performed a beneficial economic function, as Greenbergʼs emphatic 
promotion of the “ʼtriumphʼ of a specifically American Art” stimulated the development of its 
art markets.249        
Abstract Expressionism thus is intimately connected to a mid-century Americanness, 
and along with the United Statesʼ political, economic and corporate interests, it provided an 
ideal template for the revision of an outmoded copyright statute.  Significantly, the 1976 Actʼs 
legislative history reveals that most of the statutory language was not drafted by members of 
Congress (or their staffs), but instead “evolved through a process of negotiation among 
authors, publishers and other parties with economic interests in the property rights the 
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statute defines.”250  According to Litman, “[t]o understand the language of the 1976 Act, one 
must look to the understanding of the people who agreed on the compromises reflected in 
the statute,” which is “[v]ital to deciphering the statuteʼs complexities.”251   
By 1962, roughly two years into the drafting of the 1976 Act, Pop art was thrust to the 
forefront of the art world and market “almost overnight.”252  According to Christin Mamiya, 
between the years 1958-1964, “the United States witnessed an explosion in the size and 
geographic diversity of American corporations,” which resulted in the development of a 
corporate mentality.253  Moreover, Mamiya proposes that as Pop artists manipulated the 
strategies and processes of corporate dominance—namely the creation of vast capital 
through the mechanical mass production of commodity goods—it “did more than reflect 
consumer culture,” and instead “brought about a realignment of the cultural community so 
that it was more consistent with corporate models[.]”254  Advertising is regarded an advocate 
of this corporate mentality; for example, corporate sponsorship of art exhibitions and cultural 
events tangibly correlates the creative act with increased profit margins.255   
 Despite the rapidly growing accolade (both critical and popular) of Pop art, the 
drafters—and the lobbyists—of the 1976 Act advocated a federal copyright statute steeped 
in an Abstract Expressionist ideology.  According to Jessica E. Cohen, Professor at 
Georgetown University Law Center, “talking about incentives for authors is more palatable 	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than asking for corporate welfare, so thatʼs why the copyright industries do it—often in 
laughably unsubtle ways.”256  By adopting the tenets of an exclusively American art 
movement, one conveniently saturated in economic, political, and corporate motivations, 
copyright law maintained its constitutional integrity while still catering to entrepreneurial 
interests. While Pop artists critically employed industrial means of mass production, the 
gestural markings of Abstract Expressionism embodied the existentialist act of creation—a 
singular moment that could be semantically divested from the prevailing corporate mentality 
and vested with copyright ownership and originality.  
Celebrated art critic Harold Rosenberg famously stated, “[a]t a certain moment the 
canvas began to appear to one American (Abstract Expressionist) painter after another as 
an arena in which to act—rather than as a space in which to reproduce, redesign, analyze or 
ʻexpressʼ an object, actual or imagined.”257  Section 102 of the 1976 Act manipulates this 
sentiment to vest federal copyright protection in “original work[s] of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression,” and by appropriating an Abstract Expressionist ethos—with 
an emphasis on originality and attributable authorship—the law covertly imbues copyright 
jurisprudence with the movementʼs subtle political, economic and corporate associations.258  
Moreover, by shifting the moment of federal copyright protection from publication to creation 
the 1976 Act significantly altered the legal theory of copyright legislation, as it took the 
theories developed in the 1909 Act to fruition (as discussed in Chapter Two), and firmly 
vested intellectual property with a natural-law property right of ownership. 	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The 1909 Act, and all the preceding copyright acts, maintained a regulatory copyright 
function predicated upon the act of publication, however the 1976 Act vested intellectual 
property with the fastidious tenets of real property law.  Justified as providing economic 
incentive for artistic production, ultimately, the Act granted individual copyright owners 
(personal and corporate) the absolute right to control the reproduction of cultural images.  
Therefore, the 1976 Act effectively reduced the American landscape from which artists can 
utilize and reference in their own work.  As Rosenberg poetically suggested, “[t]he big 
moment [in Abstract Expressionism] came when it was decided to paint . . . just to PAINT. 
The gesture on the canvas [as the] gesture of liberation, from value—political, esthetic, 
moral[,]”  The 1976 Act appropriated precisely this purely aesthetic moment, “the gesture,” to 
implement and validate its grant of natural-property rights.259  I argue that it is precisely this 
appropriation that Warhol critiques in his expressionistic late works, and as he was 
economically affected by the constraints of 1909 Act, in his late 1980s painting he blatantly 
reduced the gestural drip to its corporate essence: money. 
 
Andy Warhol: A New Gestural Style for a Newly Individualized Copyright Legislation   
Thirteen years after Warholʼs dramatic retirement from painting in 1965, and 
immediately before he resumed his career as a “fine” artist, the Copyright Act of 1976 took 
effect (effective January 1, 1978).260  As discussed in Chapter Two, Warhol was sued during 
his tenure as a Pop artist, under the presiding 1909 Act, however, how these lawsuits 
influenced his later artistic production has been largely ignored.  As Warhol famously 
proclaimed in the 1970s:   	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Business art is the step that comes after Art. I started as a commercial artist, and I want to 
finish as a business artist.  After I did the thing called “art” or whatever itʼs called, I went into 
business art.  I wanted to be an Art Businessman or a Business Artist.  Being in good business 
is the most fascinating kind of art.  During the hippie era people put down the idea of 
business—theyʼd say, “Money is bad,” and “Working is bad,” but making money is art and 
working is art and good business is the best art.261 
 
Although it is difficult to access the sincerity or truthfulness of Warholʼs sardonic statements, 
the aforesaid quote denotes a differentiation between “art” and “business art,” a delineation 
made after his multiple legal bouts as a “fine” artist.  An analysis of his late work will not only 
shed light on the aesthetic affects of the 1976 Act, but also clarify Warholʼs late “business” 
art,” a facet of his expansive career that has wrongfully been neglected from Warhol 
scholarship.   
In a 1966 interview with Gretchen Berg, Warhol glibly stated, “I donʼt paint anymore . 
. . I could do two things at the same time but movies are more exciting.  Painting was just a 
phrase I went through.”262  However, according to art historian and curator Joseph D. Ketner 
II, by the end of the 1970s Warhol felt trapped by his public persona and “longed for the 
stimulation of new ideas and new art . . . from the moment [he] pissed on a painting in the 
seminal summer of 1977, he catalyzed a chemical reaction in his art practice (Fig. 24).”263  
He classifies this gesture (pissing on canvas) as an “act of defiance” that “freed Warholʼs 
hand from the pencil, the screenprint, the camera, and the recorder, and thus thrust his body 
physically back into the action of making art, the performance of painting.”264  Notably, 
Keterʼs description of Warholʼs return to painting is reminiscent of Rosenbergʼs lyrical 
portrayal of mid-century American action painting, whereby “[t]he act of painting is of the 
same metaphysical substance as the artistʼs existence.  The new painting has broken down 
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every distinction between art and life.”265  While multiple scholars have noted the quotation 
of Abstract Expressionism, especially the virile gestural markings of Jackson Pollock (fig. 8), 
in Warholʼs late work; I further this discussion by asserting that his return to hand-painted art 
making was motivated and influenced by his interactions with copyright law.  
As Rosenbergʼs “new painting” broke down the “distinction[s] between art and life,” in 
the 1980s, after the implementation of Americaʼs individualized copyright statute, Warholʼs 
gestural paintings break down the distinction between art and law; furthermore the Dollar 
Signs (1982) series tangibly abstracts the historic distinction between art, law and money 
(Fig. 25).266  Immediately preceding this late period of creative productivity, according to 
Ketner, Warhol was plagued with “a brief but intense period of self doubt[,] reminiscent of 
the anxiety he felt when he quit painting in 1965, fearing that he ʻwas running out of things to 
paint.ʼ”267  He continues to argue that it was during this introspective period of “self-doubt” 
that Warhol rediscovered his desire to “paint,” “[a]nd because he “matured during the 
hegemony of Abstract Expressionism, ʻseriousʼ painting for Warhol meant abstraction.”268  
While Ketner asserts that Warholʼs late work “expresses his personal artistic voice behind 
the public business ventures of his print commissions, television productions, and fashion 
engagements,” I propose that this “personal voice” is his appropriation and critique of 
American copyright law, as the law effectively mitigated the “things” that Warhol could 
paint.269   
In The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A to B and Back Again), published in 1975, 
Warhol confessed:  	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The hardest work I ever had to do mentally was go to court and get insulted by a lawyer.  Youʼre 
really on your whenn when youʼre up there on the witness stand and your friends canʼt stand up 
for you and everythingʼs quiet except for you and the lawyer, and the lawyerʼs insulting you and 
you have to let him.270 
 
This strikingly sincere portrayal of the artistʼs experience with the legal system localizes 
the aesthetic “anxiety” Warhol felt after he quit painting.271  Situated within the same 
chapter as the previously quoted discussion of business art (chapter six entitled “Work”), I 
believe that this self-conscious reflection denotes the catalyst of Warholʼs transition into 
“business artist.”272  Business structures, such as the corporation or the limited liability 
company, limit, or in the case of corporations, nullify the financial liability accessible to the 
shareholder/owner, and as the owner of Warhol Enterprises, legally incorporated on 
January 1, 1957, Warhol would have been aware of the ameliorative affect of 
incorporation.  Therefore, after being sued multiple times in the 1960s for copyright 
infringement, I propose that Warhol categorized his late work as “business art” as a means 
to protect his creative and financial assets.     
According to Gerard Malanga, an artist who worked closely with Warhol during the 
1960s, after dealing with the multiple copyright suits, “Andy realized that he had to be careful 
about appropriating for the fear of being sued again[.]”273  After its enactment, the 1976 Act 
granted federal copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression,” and after Warholʼs emphatic shift to business art in the 1970s, he 
tactfully employed a gestural style that embodied the Abstract Expressionist spirit of the 
law.274  Furthermore, Malanga noted the specific influence of copyright law on Warholʼs art 
making, and stated that “[his] entry into photography vis a vis his creation of silkscreen 	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paintings was done out of necessity,” as “[h]e opted to start taking his own photographs” 
after the copyright litigation of the 1960s (figs. 26-27).275  It is plausible that this influence 
expanded to the rest of his oeuvre, and that due to his “fear of being sued again” Warhol 
manipulated his machine-like style to conform to personalized strictures of the 1976 Act.276   
Despite Warholʼs revival of a more conservative aesthetic technique, I maintain that 
his late work sustained their critical edge, and can ultimately be considered the most 
decisive facet of his profuse oeuvre.  Instead of merely representing the redundancies of 
Americaʼs commodity-driven culture, as an entrepreneur, Warholʼs late work critiqued legal 
exigencies from the inside.  As he revisited his copyright infringing paintings of the 1960s 
and advertised technology that blatantly facilitating copyright infringement (TDK and Sony 
Betamax), Warhol visually revealed copyright lawʼs underlying (although carefully 
concealed) impetus: money. 
Warhol revisited the subject of money in his 1981 Dollar Sign series.  However, 
rather than depict measurable units of legal tender, he abstracted Americaʼs capitalist 
system and reduced it to its most readily available form—the dollar sign (Fig. 25).  Exhibited 
at the Leo Castelli Gallery in 1982 (the same gallery where he first exhibited the Flowers 
series), the series was critically deplored, and Thomas Lawson, in Artforum, proclaimed that 
Warhol “ha[d] hit the bottom.”  In this review, Lawson presumed that Warhol created the 
works to sell to “those wonderful people who commission portraits, the wonderful people 
who think that supply-side economics and an increased military budget is wonderful too,” 
and Robert Hughes, the same critic who praised Pollockʼs paintings for their inability to be 
forged, accused Warhol of “supply-side aesthetics.”277  Consequently, while the artworld 
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anxiously tried to detach itself from American politics and economics (Hughes also accused 
Warhol, through Interview magazine, of supporting Regan politics), Warhol strategically 
plastered the walls of a prominent New York City gallery with his gestural abstractions of 
American capitalism (Fig. 28).278 
The Dollar Sign silkscreens were based on Warholʼs drawings of the sign, and 
specifically emphasized the vestigial mark of the artistʼs hand.  These works have been 
characterized by multiple scholars, including art historian Allison Unruh, as a “kind of 
celebratory portrait of [a ubiquitous] symbol,ʼ one “[m]arked by a distinct sensuality, amplified 
by their physical trace of the drawn. . . the quavering line that multiplies their contours 
reiterates a sense of movement and vitality.”279  Lyrically describing the indexical nature of 
the paintings, Unruh entrenches the works with an expressly Abstract Expressionist 
ideology; a style that, as previously described, had been intimately linked to Americaʼs 
governmental, corporate, and economic interests.280  By manipulating the social implications 
of this individualistic style, Warholʼs work can also be viewed to prod at the conservative 
constrictions of Americaʼs copyright law.   
Philosopher Arthur Danto, in the article “Andy Warhol and the Love of $$$$$,” 
proposes that Warholʼs use of the Abstract Expressionist drip in the Dollar Sign series was a 
celebratory means to convey a symbol that “defined the symbolic content of the common 	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mind of his time,” as the “metaphysical” drip referred “[as much to art] as to [the] economic 
and political myth of reality.”281  As copyright law inserted itself into Dantoʼs “myth of reality” 
by increasingly policing its expression, the silkscreened drips of Warholʼs Dollar Sign 
paintings subvert the myth of artistic creation and illustrate the economic and corporate 
interests of American copyright law.  In a 2010 interview, when asked his “general take on 
Warholʼs relationship with money[,] Vincent Fremont, former vice president Warhol 
Enterprises Inc., succinctly responded, “[h]e was always afraid of losing it.”282  Therefore, as 
copyright law potentially posed a major threat to his fiscal worth, Warhol adapted his modus 
operandi to adhere to its limitations.  He did not, however, simply conform to legislative 
mandate, but instead manipulated its text to produce a critical body of work that 
mischievously reduced himself, painting and copyright to one identifiable emblem: money.  
And, as Warhol financed his copyright suits in the 1960s by selling and gifting the legally 
suspect works, in the 1980s, he created a federally copyrightable “abstraction of value” to 
implicate the veiled, yet mutually dependent, relationships between art, money, and law.283  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Art is sexy! Art is money-sexy!  
Art is money-sexy-social-climbing-fantastic!284 
  
On January 20, 2012, Congress fatefully shelved both the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA).  Both bills were met with fierce 
outcry from Internet users, and were shelved largely because of the “largest online protest in 
[American] history.”285  If passed, SOPA (the broader of the two acts) would essentially be 
an “Internet death penalty.”286  Not only would it allow the U.S. attorney general to seek court 
orders against targeted “rogue” websites, it would also require Internet search engines, like 
Wikipedia and Google, to monitor customersʼ traffic and block websites suspected of 
copyright infringement.287  The billʼs overly broad coverage sparked popular dissent and 
mass-protest, as SOPA was felt to stretch the ownership rights of copyright too far.  Anti-
SOPA trade group Net Coalition stated, “[t]he legislation systematically favors a copyright 
ownerʼs intellectual property rights and strips the owners of websites [accused of 
infringement] of their rights.”288   
The publicʼs reaction to the potentially onerous effect of broad copyright ownership 
illustrates both the social significance of intellectual property, and the rebellion its restrictions 	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instigate.  According to John Bliss, president of the International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition, “[i]ntellectual property is to the twentieth [and twenty-first] centur[ies] what coal 
was to the nineteenth century,”  and as “[intellectual property] has become like a natural 
resource[,] [i]t is every bit as valuable, if not more valuable, than personal property.”289  As 
such, Bliss considers counterfeiting to be the chief threat to the United Statesʼ economy.290  
Commercial counterfeiting involves the “unauthorized and fraudulent reproduction” of 
intellectual property, and while it is a separate legal issue than the counterfeiting of money, 
the grant of federal protection illustrates the comparable social and economic value of the 
two designations.291  I argue that it is at this point—the intersection of art, law and money—
that Andy Warhol manipulates and critiqued in his art..       
While Pop art mitigates the boundaries of art and life, the trajectory of Warholʼs life 
and paintings can be seen to take this negotiation one step further in collapsing the 
boundaries of art and law.  Similarly, late nineteenth-century money painters can be seen to 
develop this type of social and legal critique.  These artists, working within the trompe lʼoeil 
style, depicted hyper illusionistic renderings of nostalgic, time specific, commodity goods, 
including William Harnett who, in 1877, Harnett created the first image of paper money (Fig. 
1).  The subject of money, when read in terms of the social, political, and economic context 
of the late nineteenth century, especially the shift from industrial to consumer capitalism, 
illustrates the playful subversion of these artists.  Appropriating a venerated symbol of 
consumerist iconology, these artists sarcastically questioned the materialistic values, social 
and aesthetic, of Americans culture.  The law, however, did not passively observe the 
objectification of such a potent symbol.  Standardized currency represented the authority of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 John Bliss, as cited by Paul R. Paradise, Trademark Counterfeiting, Product Piracy, and the Billion Dollar 
Threat to the U.S. Economy (Westport & London: Quorum Books, 1999) pp. 5-6. 
290 Ibid, 6. 
291 Ibid, 1.  Trademark counterfeiting refers to the unauthorized reproduction (or counterfeiting) of trademarks, 
and industrial piracy involves the theft of trade secrets. Ibid. 
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Americaʼs freshly centralized federal government, and by labeling money paintings as 
counterfeit, the law seized jurisdiction to secure the abstracted fiscal and social value of both 
paper money and fine art.  
 Although Harnett stopped painting paper currency after his studio was raided by the 
Secret Service, artists such as John Haberle and Victor Dubreuil continued the tradition, and 
almost exclusively created money paintings despite their express illegality.  Furthermore, 
many of these works directly criticized, or poked fun at, the lawʼs attempt to regulate art 
making, and in Haberleʼs Reproduction, circa 1887, the artist humorously “dares the world to 
mistake his work for counterfeiting (Fig. 29).”292  Pointedly, however, Haberle qualifies this 
challenge by including a newspaper clipping of an art review stating, “[y]et . . . it is entirely 
done with a brush.”293  It is this distinction, the counterfeit versus the original, that Warhol 
critiques in his late artwork, and I assert that he employs the markings of “the brush” to 
critique the constraints imposed by American copyright legislation.294  
 The history of Americaʼs copyright statute reflects the social, economic and aesthetic 
concerns of the day, and as copyright regulates the right to copy, the perpetually expanding 
scope of federal copyright protection articulates societyʼs apprehension of unregulated, 
especially mechanical, reproduction.  This fear was exasperated in the 1909 Act and 
Warholʼs “machine” aesthetic.  As illustrated in chapter two, the 1909 Act, although arguably 
unbeknownst to Congress, vested in the copyright owner an absolute right to copy his “work 
of art” (so long as the statuteʼs formalities were met).  Clearly separating the copyright from 
the material object copyrighted, Congress shifted its protection of the copy, as noun, to the 
act copying, as verb.  This semantic change, as demonstrated in Mazer v. Stein, not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Chambers, Old Money, 26. 
293 Ibid.  According to Alfred Frankenstein, the originals of the newspaper clipping depicted in the paintings were 
maintained at the artistʼs home. However, the illustrated clipping labeled “John Haberle the Counter[feiter],” was 
the artistʼs creation.  Frankenstein concludes, “this, of course, is at it should be. A newspaper story about painted 
counterfeiters ought itself to be a counterfeit.” Frankenstein, After the Hunt, 116. 
294 Ibid. 
	   	   91	  
	  
expanded the ownership rights of the copyright holder, but also allowed the judiciary to 
include more objects under the “works of art” designation: for example, an Art Deco inspired 
lamp base (Fig. 11).   
I argue that the 1909 Act, and its expanded scope of protection, provides the 
theoretical underpinnings of Pop art, which is expressly evidenced through the oeuvre of 
Andy Warhol.  As federal copyright textually (the shift from “fine art” to “works of art”) and 
judicially expanded its protection to mundane consumer objects, circus posters (Bleistein) 
and lamp bases (Mazer), it legally mitigated the hierarchical distinction of art and life.  As 
mid-century critics, such as Clement Greenberg and Harold Rosenberg, attempted to 
reclaim “fine” art by emphasizing “the brush” or the inimitable indexical markings of the artist, 
Pop artists rebelliously repudiated these ideals, and instead of looking inward for creative 
influence, they appropriated vital elements of Americaʼs readily reproducible, and often 
trademarked or copyrighted, popular culture.295  As such, much like the preceding trompe 
lʼoeil painters, in the post World War Two milieu of revived consumerist concern, Pop artists 
rebelled against cultural and legal authority by depicting the iconic elements of Americaʼs 
expanding economy: commodity goods and paper money.       
Warholʼs work and persona epitomizes this rebellion.   Attending Carnegie Tech in 
the 1950s, Warholʼs education was steeped in the import of socially aware, hierarchy 
blurring, artwork.  After graduating, he quickly became one of New York Cityʼs premier 
commercial artists, and in order to fulfill the demand for his work he hired assistants to 
reproduce his original drawings through his emblematic blotted line technique.  Significantly, 
during this time, what is generally coined his commercial period, Warhol created a vast 
amount of drawings and prints fancifully depicting American currency.  As a successful 
commercial artist, art making equated money, and Warhol quickly developed scrupulous 	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business (and aesthetic) tactics to increase his gross profit margins.  Seymour Berlin, a 
printer who created many of Warholʼs promotional books in the 1950s stated, “[a]nything 
Andy had to do with anybody was to get more work, more illustrations, more jobs.  Every 
friend he had, every contact he made, was for what he could get out of it . . . Andy was the 
most opportunistic person Iʼve ever known.”296   
This commercial ethos continued into Warholʼs career as a Pop artist, and I assert 
that the progression of his artistic production, including his often-segregated work in the 
1980s, reflects his knowledge of, and reaction against, the mandates of federal copyright 
law.  In an interview with curator Allison Unruh, Vincent Fremont, former vice president of 
Warhol and Interview enterprises, emphatically stated that “Andy was totally in control of his 
business, but he pretended not to be to the outside world . . . [he] was actually an incredibly 
astute and natural businessman himself [and he] always amazed lawyers and advisors with 
his questions because they were right to the point.”297  Accordingly, I assert that Warhol 
utilized his business and legal acumen to perpetuate a legally subversive body of work, and 
that he utilized his childish persona to nullify any professional ramifications.   
 Notably, the final appearance of Warholʼs 1962 money paintings was a legal 
compromise, as the printing press Warhol commissioned to make the screen would not 
duplicate real or photographed money, since it would run afoul of federal counterfeit law.  As 
Warhol was required to draw the source material, it was the law that forced his hand back 
into his art making process.  Immediately after his money paintings, Warhol began to 
silkscreen photographic images, and as these images were typically appropriated from 
popular publications, like Life Magazine, the application of Warholʼs hand became twice 
removed from his artistic production.  Martha Buskirk argued that “[w]hen artists use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Seymour Berlin, as cited in Sara Urist Green, “Andy Warhol: Master of Exchange” in Andy Warhol 
Enterprises, 127.  
297 Fremont, “Interview with Vincent Fremont,” in Andy Warhol Enterprises, 151. 
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techniques that are similar to the reproductive techniques employed in the mass media, then 
the owners of copyrighted imagery are much more likely to feel their interests are threatened 
by the artistic appropriation.”298  In the mid-1960s, Warhol created artwork that quoted both 
the subject matter and productive technique of the mass media, and as described in Chapter 
Three, he was sued multiple times for copyright infringement.   
I believe these infringement suits strongly influenced his art making and ultimately 
defined his career as a business artist. To settle his lawsuits, Warhol paid his accusers in 
both artwork and money, symbolically conflating the legal prescriptions of each entity, and 
when he returned to painting in the 1970s, his new works exaggerated the gestural nature of 
his brushwork.  Warhol exasperated the painterly look in his commissioned portraits, 
laconically stating, “Now Iʼm trying to put style back into them. Iʼm sort of hand painting. 
When I do the portraits, I sort of half paint them to give it a style.  Itʼs more fun—and itʼs 
faster to do (Fig. 30).”299   As Warhol supported himself on income derived from these 
commissions, the gestural style he utilized can be reduced to a commodity good: money.  
Moreover, in Chapter Four I argue that Warhol specially adopted the Abstract Expressionist 
ideology of the 1976 Act to mischievously work within the constraints of copyright law and 
solidify the economic value of his “original wor[k] of authorship fixed in [a] tangible medium 
of expression,” an intent physically manifested in his critically deplored Dollar Sign series 
(Figs. 25 and 28).300  Therefore, when considered through a legal lens, Warholʼs late oeuvre 
can be viewed as divisively as his Pop art paintings: in the 1960s his Pop artwork blurred the 
carefully delineated boundaries between commercial and “fine” art; in the 1980s, he 
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299 Andy Warhol, as cited in Marco Livingstone, “Do it Yourself: Notes on Warholʼs Technqiues,” in Andy Warhol 
a Retrospective, Kynaston McShine, ed. (Boston: Bullfince Press, Little, Brown and Company), 75. 
300 Cornell University Law School, “§ 102. Subject matter of copyright: In general,” U.S. Code 
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strategically appropriated “fine” art, Abstract Expressionism, to critique the institutions that 
elevated its status—copyright law and artworld economics. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
William Michael Harnett, Still-Life Five Dollar Bill, 1877, 
 Oil on canvas, 8 x 12 in., 
Philadelphia Museum of Art, Alex Simpson Jr. Collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
William Michael Harnett, American Exchange, 1878,  
Oil on canvas, 
Detroit Institute of Arts, Gift of Robert H. Tannahill. 
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Figure 3 & 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After Thomas Moran, progressive proof book of On the Lookout and Cliffs of the Upper Colorado, ca. 1879, page 
from bound book of Chromolithographs, L. Prang & Co. Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, gift of Paul Mellon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	   97	  
	  
Figure 5 & 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After Thomas Moran, progressive proof book of On the Lookout and Cliffs of the Upper Colorado, ca. 1879, page 
from bound book of Chromolithographs, L. Prang & Co. Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library, gift of Paul Mellon. 
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Figure 7 
 
 
 
Courier Lithography Company, The Great Wallace Shows, c. 1898, 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Company, 188 U.S. 239 (1903).   
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
 
 
John Haberle, Torn in Transit, 1890-95,  
Oil on canvas, 
Collection of the Brandywine River Museum, gift of Amanda K. Perls 
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Figure 9 
 
 
Jackson Pollock, Number 1, 1950 (Lavender Mist), 1950, 
Oil, enamel and aluminum on canvas, 
87 x 118 in. (221 x 299.7 cm), 
National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
 
 
“Jackson Pollock: Is he the greatest living painter in the United States?” 
Life Magazine 27, no. 6, August 8, 1949, 42-45. 
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Figure 11 
 
 
 
 
Lamp Base Statuette, c. 1953 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
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Figure 12 
 
 
 
 
 
Robert Lepper, “The Elements of Visual Perception,”  
Art Instruction, October 1938, 10. 
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Figure 13 
 
 
 
 
“Crazy Golden Slippers: Famous people inspire fanciful footwear,”  
Life Magazine 42, no. 3, January 21, 1957, 12-13. 
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Figure 14 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Money Tree, about 1957, 
Ink and wash on Strathmore paper,  
22 ½ x 16 ½ in. (57.2 x 41.9 cm),  
Private Collection. 
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Figure 15 
 
 
 
 
 
Window Display, Bonwit Teller, New York, April 1961, 
The Andy Warhol Museum, Pittsburg;  
Founding Collection, Contribution 
The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. 
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Figure 16 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Superman, 1960, 
Synthetic polymer paint and crayon on canvas, 
67 x 52 in. (170 x 133 cm.), 
Collection Gunter Sachs. 
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Figure 17 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, One Hundred Cans, 1962 
Oil on canvas, 
6 ft. x 52 in. (182.9 x 132.1 cm.), 
Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, 
Gift of Seymour H. Knox. 
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Figure 18 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, 200 One Dollar Bills, 1962 
Silkscreen ink and pencil on canvas, 
80 ¼ x 92 ¼ in. (203.8 x 234.3 cm), 
Private Collection. 
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Figure 19 
 
 
 
 
Dollar-bill woodblock from Warhol studio. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Two-Dollar Bill with Jefferson, 1962, 
Pencil on paper, 
18 x 24 in. (45.7 x 61 cm), 
Collection Louise Ferrari, Houston. 
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Figure 21 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Flowers, 1964, 
Acrylic and silkscreen ink on linen, 
48 x 48 in. (121.9 x 121.9 cm). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	   110	  
	  
Figure 22 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol Source Material, 1964 
Tear-sheet from the June 1964 issue of Modern Photography, 
16 ¼ x 11 ¼ in. (41.3 x 28.6 cm). 
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Figure 23 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Flowers, 1967, 
Synthetic polymer and silkscreen inks on canvas, 
48 x 48 in. (121.9 x 121.9 cm). 
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Figure 24 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Oxidation Painting (in 12 parts), 1978 
Acrylic and urine on linen, 
48 x 49 in. (121.9 x 124.5 cm), 
The Andy Warhol Museum, Pittsburg; 
Founding Collection,  
Contribution The Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts. 
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Figure 25 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Dollar Sign, 1981 
Acrylic and silkscreen on linen, 
90 x 70 in (228.6 x 177.8 cm) 
The Andy Warhol Museum, Pittsburg; 
Founding Collection, Contribution 
The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc.  
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Figure 26 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Uncle Sam, 1981 
Polacolor 2 
4.24 x 3.375 in. 
Savannah College of Art and Design Museum or Art,  
Gift of the Andy Warhol Foundation of the Visual Arts. 
 
 
Figure 27 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Witch (Margaret Hamilton), 1980 
Polacolor 2. 
3 ½ x 4 ½ in. 
University of Nebraska—Lincoln,  
Gift from Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts 
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Figure 28 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Dollar Signs, 1981 
Acrylic and silkscreen ink on linen, 
90 x 70 in (288.6 x 177.8 cm) 
The Andy Warhol Museum, Pittsburg; 
Founding Collection, Contribution, 
The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc.   
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Figure 29 
 
 
 
 
John Haberle, Reproduction, 1886-87, 
Oil on Canvas 
10 x 14 in. 
Portland Museum of Art, Maine. 
Gift of Dr. Walter Goldfarb, M.D. 
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Figure 30 
 
 
 
 
Andy Warhol, Ileana Sonnabend, 1973 
Acrylic and silkscreen on canvas, 
Each 101.9 x 101.5 cm, 
The Sonnabend Collection. 
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